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VIRTUAL BRIEFING AT THE SUPREME COURT
Jeffrey L. Fishe-t & Allison Orr Larsent
The open secret of Supreme Court advocacy in a digital
era is that there is a new way to argue to the Justices. To-
day's Supreme Court arguments are developed online: they
are dissected and explored in blog posts, fleshed out in popu-
lar podcasts, and analyzed and re-analyzed by experts who
do not represent he parties or have even filed a brief in the
case at all. This "virtual briefing" (as we call it) is intended to
influence the Justices and their law clerks but exists com-
pletely outside of traditional briefing rules. This article de-
scribes virtual briefing and makes a case that the key players
inside the Court are listening. In particular, we show that the
Twitter patterns of law clerks indicate they are paying close
attention to producers of virtual briefing, and threads of these
arguments (proposed and developed online) are starting to
appear in the Court's decisions.
We argue that this "crowdsourcing" dynamic to Supreme
Court decision-making is at least worth a serious pause.
There is surely merit to enlarging the dialogue around the
issues the Supreme Court decides; maybe the best ideas will
come from new voices left out of the traditional briefing pro-
cess. But the confines of the adversarial process have been
around for centuries, and there are significant risks that come
with operating outside of them, particularly given the unique
nature and speed of online discussions. We analyze those
risks in this Article and suggest it is time to think hard about
embracing virtual briefing, truly assessing what can be gained
and what will be lost along the way.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a Supreme Court advocate at lunch after oral ar-
gument thinking of a point she wished she had raised in the
courtroom, then picking up her phone to call or text the Jus-
tices to add a quick "P.S." to her answers. Now imagine a
company who wants to weigh in on a pending controversy but
for whatever reason does not want its name on a brief, so
instead it contacts a well-known academic to e-mail the sub-
stance of the company's desired message to the Justices. Or
how about an experienced and trusted Supreme Court advo-
cate who thinks a different litigator failed to adequately answer
a question at argument and so stops by a Justice's chambers
the next day to offer a different way to resolve the case?
These thought experiments may seem outlandish. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has strict rules about supplemental brief-
ing and disclosures, and the Justices do not often make excep-
tions.' But the not-so-secret secret of Supreme Court
advocacy is that there is a new way to argue at the Supreme
Court through a conversation that exists completely outside of
the Court's briefing rules.
1 Supreme Court Rule 25.7 states that after a case has been argued or
submitted, "the Clerk will not file any brief, except that of a party filed by leave of
the Court." See also STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 716 (10th
ed. 2013) (exceptions to this rule are made only for "late authorities, newly en-
acted legislation, or other intervening matter that was not available in time to be
included," and these exceptions are only available to parties, not amici); id. at 762
(post-argument letters that are "strictly factual" may be addressed to the Clerk by
letter). For the Supreme Court rules on disclosure (corporate disclosure rules and
amicus disclosure rules generally) see Rules 29.6 and 37.6.
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Today's Supreme Court arguments are developed online.
They are fleshed out and explored in blog posts;2 the advocates
are invited to elaborate on popular podcasts (sometimes even
just days before or after their oral argument);3 and the Justices'
musings at argument are analyzed and re-analyzed publicly
and by a wide variety of players at the very same time the law
clerks are writing bench memos and the Justices are making
their decisions.4 If indeed law students (and hence recently-
graduated law clerks) are now taught to "Google" a case before
beginning any assignment,5 every pending case at the Court
will generate a treasure trove of results for them-certainly not
restricted to submissions on the docket.
The point of this Article is to describe and evaluate this
practice-what we call "virtual briefing"-at the Supreme
Court.6 There are now nearly twenty blogs largely dedicated to
covering activity at the Supreme Court7 and over a dozen pod-
2 Of course, SCOTUSblog, https://scotusblog.com [https://perma.cc/
84HS-TUX2], is the oldest and most popular law blog covering the Supreme
Court, but there is now a cottage industry of blogs that cover the Court. To name
just a few, see ABovE L., https://abovethelaw.com [https://perma.cc/XQG7-
B3F41; AM. CONST. SOC'Y: ACS BLOGS, https://acslaw.org/acsblog/ [https://
perma.cc/T8JP-DNH6; FED. Soc'y: BLOG POSTS, https://fedsoc.org/commentary/
blog-posts; JosT ON JUSTICE, https://jostonjustice.com; JUSTIA: VERDIcT, https://
verdict.justia.com; LAWFARE, https://1awfareblog.com; NAT. CONST. DAILY: CONST.
DAILY, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/ [https://perma.cc/V9H9-WKE7];
REASON: VOLOCK CONSPIRAcY, https: //reason. com/volokh/ [https://perma.cc/
VV7T-M2ER]; and TAKE CARE, https://takecareblog.com [https://perma.cc/
YRN3-T7LM].
3 See e.g., Amicus, SLATE, https://slate.com/podcasts/amicus [https://
perma.cc/VL2X-SNUF]; COUNTING TO 5, https://countingto5.com [https://
perma.cc/PNN2-H5SS; FIRST MONDAYS, https://firstmondays.fm [https://
perma.cc/5GTH-4QMU]; More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS, https://wnycstudios.org/
podcasts/radiolabmoreperfect [https://perma.cc/Y8GM-DH63]; SCOTUScast,
FED. Soc'Y, https://fedsoc.org/commentary/podcasts?category=scotuscast
[https://perma.cc/42GS-UXTJ; SCOTUS 101, HERITAGE FOUND., https://heri-
tage.org/scotus-101 [https://perma.cc/V5F6-Y49A].
4 Seeinfrapp.91-100.
5 Stephen Rynkiewicz, What Bloggers Told Us About the State of the Legal
Blogosphere, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/arti-
cle/what bloggerstold-usaboutthestateof the-legal-blogosphere [https://
perma.cc/RWL9-JZ9G] ("For many people, their first step in legal research is to go
to Google, not Westlaw or Nexis[.]").
6 This subject has largely eluded academic attention, but one of our former
students wrote an excellent Note on the topic towards the dawn of the Supreme
Court blogging era. See generally Rachel C. Lee, Note, Ex Parte Blogging: The
Legal Ethics of Supreme Court Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1535,
1535-71 (2009) (situating the problem of "ex parte blogging" within ethics rules of
the legal profession).
7 A blog is a website "offering a reverse chronological series of short essays or
'posts' by an author[,] . . . group of member-authors, or posts from guest au-
thors. . . . Some blogs also allow visitors to the site to write comments about
posts." Id. at n.6. For examples of legal blogs that cover the Court, see ACLU:
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casts devoted to the same cause." These blog posts and pod-
casts are organized on the left and on the right, by Supreme
Court insiders and by groups that are more fringe players.
They are run by academics, former clerks, current advocates,
special interest groups and more.
The "analog" version of "virtual briefing" is likely newspa-
per op-eds by reporters who cover the Court. But, as we elabo-
rate below, there are features of virtual briefing that make this
new communication mode distinct-just as the Supreme Court
has already recognized that other forms of digital communica-
tion are qualitatively different from their analog precursors.9
Virtual briefing is a way to argue to the Justices and their law
clerks in real time about the disputes they are evaluating. It is
also a method open to nearly everyone, without required fact-
checkers or the same journalistic or other professional reputa-
tional interests. Put simply, Supreme Court arguments have
never before been crowdsourced. They are now.
Oddly, if there is anyone this new regime leaves out, it is
the principal advocates themselves-possibly for fear of trans-
gressing at least the spirit of the Court's rules governing brief-
ing and oral argument. But even the advocates are now
gradually being encouraged to enter the mix: as the hosts of
one popular podcast put it, a goal of that oral form of virtual
briefing is to allow the advocates time to discuss the "cool
BLOGS, https://aclu.org/blog [https://perma.cc/7NWU-NBTr] (covering the Su-
preme Court, among other subjects); BALKINIZATION, https://balkin.blogspot.com
[https://perma.cc/K4NZ-DNC3]; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://bren-
nancenter.org [https://perma.cc/FA6V-VEL4]; CONST. L. PROFESSOR BLOG, https:/
/lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/ (https://perma.cc/6NX9-ENCF; CATO
INST.: CATO LIBERTY, https://cato.org/blog [https://perma.cc/9Y8R-YBKR; JOSH
BLACKMAN's BLOG, http://www.joshblackman.com/blog/ [https://perma.cc/
TM93-2YVR]; JOST ON JUSTICE, supra note 2; LAWFARE, supra note 2; NAT'L CONSI.
CTR.: CONST. DAILY, supra note 2; ORIGINALISM BLOG, https://originalism-
blog.typepad.com [https://perma.cc/ALC2-VD2NJ; PRAWFSBLAWG, https://
prawfsblawg.com [https://perma.cc/QB3C-9YWT]; REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
supra note 2; SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 2; and TAKE CARE, supra note 2.
8 A podcast is an audio file that can be downloaded to a computer or mobile
device, much like a radio show that broadcasts in installments. For examples of
legal podcasts, see Amicus, SLATE, supra note 3; Cases and Controversies, BLOOM-
BERG L. (available on Apple Podcasts); Cato Daily Podcast, CATO INST., https://
cato.org/archives/type/multimedia/category/9390 [https://perma.cc/L38A-
K2V8]; CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO SUP. CT., https://cgttsc.wordpres.com [https://
perma.cc/3QFC-BG3X]; COUNTING TO 5, supra note 3; FIRST MONDAYS, supra note
3; More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS, supra note 3; NewsHour Supreme Court Podcast,
PBS, https://pbs.org/newshour/podcasts [https://perma.ce/H7Q6-KJ9R]; REA-
SON PODCAST, https://reason.com/podcast/ [https://perma.cc/E55P-H2KZ];
SCOTUScast, FED. Soc'Y, supra note 3; SCOTUS 101, HERITAGE FOUND., supra note
3; and We The People, NAT'L CONST. CTR. (available on Apple Podcasts).
9 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393-96 (2014).
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stuff 10 they did not get to in the official argument, with the
hope (sometimes said explicitly) that people inside the Court
are still listening."
This change is of a piece with a broader evolution of com-
munication in political and other realms. We now have a Presi-
dent whose primary mode of speaking to the people is via
Twitter. Congresspersons launch and sustain their campaigns
on social media. Interest groups mount their public relations
efforts online. The days of pamphleteers on street corners are,
for the most part, long gone. As our society alters the ways in
which we communicate to each other (through comment boxes,
"likes," and retweets), it should come as no surprise that we
have also adapted the way we speak to the Justices.
Further, it seems more than likely that key players inside
the Court are listening. As we describe in this paper, publicly
available records demonstrate that current Supreme Court law
clerks are following these commentators, bloggers and podcast
hosts on Twitter. Justice Kennedy, in fact, candidly said that
he asked his law clerks to read the relevant blogs once the
Court has granted certiorari on a case.12 And-although there
can never be absolute proof about what influences a Justice
and what does not-we also present a series of case examples
where arguments made in "virtual briefing," but absent or
downplayed in traditional briefing, have shown up in Supreme
Court opinions.
There surely is merit to opening up the dialogue around the
issues decided by the Supreme Court. After all, most of the
issues on the Court's docket affect more than just the parties
"o See Who is the River Master?, FIRST MONDAYS 50:20 (Oct. 9, 2017), http://
www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2017/10/9/ot2O17-2-who-is-the-river-master
(https://perma.cc/CUG8-2GRH] (discussing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018), and saying First Mondays should be the "destination podcast" for Su-
preme Court advocates who had a lot of "cool stuff in the can" that they did not get
to say at oral argument).
11 The popular podcast First Mondays (currently on hiatus) provides a good
example. The hosts, Dan Epps and Ian Samuel, often speak as if they are di-
recting their comments to people on the inside. See, e.g., Cf Everything, FIRST
MONDAYS 1:12:46 (Apr. 23, 2018), http://www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2018/4
/23/ot-2017-22-cf-everything [https://perma.cc/TY7P-BC3P] ("Justice
Sotomayor, if you're listening be on the lookout for that petition ... in the next few
months."); id. at 1:17:58 ("To the people I admire on the Court, do better.").
12 When asked whether he reads blog posts after certiorari grants, Justice
Kennedy responded: "I have my clerks do it, especially with the ones when we've
granted cert, to see how they think about what the issues are." See Kevin O'Keefe,
Supreme Court Justice Kennedy on the Value of Law Blogs, LEXBLOG (Oct. 10,
2013), https://kevin.lexblog.com/2013/10/10/supreme-court-justice-kennedy-
on-the-value-of-law-blogs/ [https://perma.cc/86B8-ZDQ7].
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before them, and maybe the best ideas will come from new
voices in the crowd. Further, as evidenced by the great boom in
amicus briefs and the free-for-all culture of Supreme Court
arguments generally,1 3 perhaps a completely open briefing sys-
tem is where we have been going all along.
We argue in this Article, however, that this is not a journey
to be taken without reflection. The adversarial system has
been around for a long time, and there are significant risks that
come from operating outside of it. We point out those risks in
this Article, and we suggest it is time to take a hard look at
"virtual briefing"-assessing truly what can be gained and what
will be lost along the way. We also freely acknowledge that we
are identifying a line-drawing problem; there is no neat and
tidy way to separate unobjectionable commentary from poten-
tially problematic communications. But wrestling with that
line is preferable to just passively accepting a new normal with-
out pausing to consider the consequences.
I
WHAT IS VIRTUAL BRIEFING?
"Virtual briefing" is the phrase we use to describe online
advocacy-written or oral-targeted at particular cases pend-
ing at the Supreme Court and outside of the normal briefing
process. We thus exclude from our discussion summaries of
argument or reporting and commentary on cases after they
have been decided. Virtual briefing, as we use the phrase,
includes some sort of element of intent to influence case out-
comes. Thus, although producers of virtual briefing likely have
multiple audiences in mind, we are concerned with online ad-
vocacy that at least in part is meant to reach the Justices' ears.
Of course, in some respects this type of briefing has hap-
pened for a long time; 14 for example, almost every New York
Times Op-Ed advocating the abolition of capital punishment
13 One of us has fretted in the past about the "free for all" culture in amicus
briefs, at least with respect to factual claims. See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble
with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REv. 1757, 1762-65 (2014).
14 Indeed, in 1977, long before the blogosphere, John Jeffries and Peter Low,
young professors at the University of Virginia, wrote an essay in the student
newspaper advancing their views in a pending criminal case. The virtual briefing
was intentional and successful (making its way into a footnote in the ultimate
decision). Looking back, Peter Low explained their motivation: "We needed to get
our views in the public domain quickly if they were ever going to come to the
attention of the court while it mattered." See Mike Fox, As Virginia Law Weekly
Turns 70, Alumni Recall Chronicling Life at UVA Law, UVA LAWYER (2018), https://
law.virginia.edu/uvalawyer/article/making-headlines {https://perma.cc/HY22-
BJN8].
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while Furman v. Georgia'5 was pending would fall under our
definition. But the phenomenon to which we refer in this Arti-
cle is newer and different in several important ways, as ex-
plored below.
A. History & Modem Prevalence of Virtual Briefing
Beginning around 2002, lawyers became some of the first
consumers and producers of blogs (also called "blawgs" in the
earlier years).16 It is not difficult to understand why. Blogs
allow commentators to offer legal arguments with a speed and
precision that is dramatically different from writing briefs or
even op-eds in traditional newspapers. As well-known scholar
and blogger Eugene Volokh explains:
[A blog post is] much easier and quicker to produce than an
amicus brief; it's often all we can do, since in many cases we
know that we won't take the time and trouble to write a brief;
and it does double duty as a way of disseminating the blog-
ger's views to the public as well as to the judges.'7
Blog posts are also cheaper than filing an amicus brief.
Provided the author already has a computer and an internet
connection, a post costs nothing to publish. Printing and filing
a brief in the Supreme Court costs at least hundreds of dol-
lars-often over $1000.18 That may not seem like too much,
but for academics on tight professional and personal budgets,
it can be quite meaningful.
Moreover, comment threads on a blog allow for a dynamic
commonly referred to as "crowdsourcing." That is, blogs pre-
sent an interactive medium that allows for "shared information
and insight."'9 And, of course-unlike parties that respond to
each other on a forty-five-day briefing schedule-blogging
threads can develop within seconds. Indeed, an important
value of blogging is that arguments and counterarguments are
being lobbed at each other in real time, while the conversation
at the Court is pending and ongoing. As one commentator puts
15 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16 Tom Mighell, Blog 2.0, Am. BAR PUBLICATIONS (April/May 2006) https://
americanbar.org/publications/law-practice_home/law_practice_arcarch/
lpmtmagazinearticlesv32_s3_an2.html [https://perma.cc/7ASW-UPL4].
17 Eugene Volokh, Scholarship, Blogging, and Tradeoffs: On Discovering, Dis-
seminating, and Doing, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (2006).
18 Companies that print Supreme Court briefs do not generally advertise their
rates online, but the authors can attest to these figures.
19 See Kevin O'Keefe, Law Blogs Ignore the History of Blogging at their Peril,
LEXBLOG (Mar. 18, 2014), https://kevin.lexblog.com/2014/03/18/law-blogs-ig-
nore-the-history-of-blogging-at-their-peril/ [https://perma.cc/ZUF9-YZUP].
91
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
it, "legal bloggers serve a valuable role in discerning what is
relevant or important, and they often do so nearly simultane-
ously with the development[.]"20 Or, put slightly differently,
blogging "fill[s] a space in American media somewhere between
formal legal publications, mainstream journalism, and water
cooler gossip."21
If blogs offer fast and targeted conversations, podcasts-
the next frontier of virtual briefing-take up a different space.
Podcasts offer a prolonged conversation with an engaged audi-
ence. In a relatively short time period, (some trace the popular-
ity of podcasts to the 2014 podcast phenomenon Serial)2 2
podcasts have skyrocketed in popularity. Most podcast listen-
ers have been listening to podcasts for three years or less.2 3
And as of 2018, 50% of all U.S. homes-over sixty million-
identify as podcast fans.24 Today, at least 112 million Ameri-
cans have listened to podcasts, a figure up 11% from 2016.25
Podcasts are valuable precisely because they reach a niche
audience and sustain their audience's attention for a relatively
long period of time.26 Over 80% of podcast listeners listen to all
or most of a forty-five to sixty-minute episode.27 In today's
world of soundbites and clickbait, a podcast consumer-a cap-
tured and engaged audience-is a rare bird. There is also a
minimal barrier to entry for podcasting (all it takes is a good
microphone) and podcasting generally reaches people who are
already interested in the subject matter and want to be enter-
tained with a prolonged conversation about issues they care
about.
20 Donald J. Kochan, The Blogosphere and the New Pamphleteers, 11 NEXUS
L.J. 99, 102 (2006).
21 Justin Krypel, A New Frontier or Merely a New Medium? An Analysis of the
Ethics of Blawgs, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 470 (2008).
22 SERIAL, https://serialpodcast.org [https://perma.cc/DYV3-CQWZ].
23 See 2019 Podcast Stats & Facts, PODCAST INSIGHTS (Mar. 6, 2019), https://
www.podcastinsights.ccmlpodcast-statistics [https://perma.cc/8NXC-55JC]
(65%).
24 See id. For a historical timeline of the "podcast" and an explanation for
how it got its name, see Podcasting Historical Timeline and Milestones, INT'L POD-
CAST DAY, https://intemationalpodcastday.com/podcasting-history/ (last visited
Aug. 26, 2019) [https://perna.cc/8KFQ-6AV7].
25 Jayson DeMers, Why Podcasts are Popular, FoRBES (July 11, 2017), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/jaysondemers/2017/07/11 why-podcasts-are-popular-
and-4-content-lessons-to-learn-from-them/#4e5784e918f6 [https://perma.cc/
8FFT-76KGl.
26 Id. Podcasts are also very attractive to advertisers because they offer a
desirable, highly engaged audience.
27 See 2019 Podcast Stats & Facts, supra note 23.
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Podcast listeners are typically "loyal, affluent and edu-
cated," often commuting and listening in their car.2 8 Seen this
way, this format is perfect for members (and hopefuls) of the
Supreme Court bar-the group of elite highly educated lawyers
who argue regularly before the Court, have the trust of the
Justices, and increasingly see themselves as helping the Court
to take the right issues and reach the right results.2 9
As you might expect, the popularity of virtual briefing for
legal arguments has skyrocketed. The American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) estimates that there were 100 legal blogs in 2002,
and 500 by 2005.3o By December 2016, that number reached
more than 4,000, by the ABA's count.3 1
To take a prominent example, SCOTUSblog, the original
and most popular blog to cover the Supreme Court (and which
one commentator humorously called "the TMZ of the legal
world"3 2) has seen a serious growth spurt over the last ten
years. By our count, in 2007, the average case on SCOTUSblog
garnered five posts per case. Ten years later, in the 2017 Term,
that number has more than doubled-eleven posts per case.
And the numbers are even more dramatic when looking at the
closely watched cases. For October Term (OT) 2007, there were
four cases that had ten or more posts on SCOTUSblog, and for
OT 2017, there were twenty-seven cases with ten or more
posts.
SCOTUSblog took blogging about the Court to a new level.
It has "become a mainstay for Washington reporters, legislators
and lobbyists."3 3 To take a dramatic example, when the Su-
preme Court announced its decision in NEIB v. Sebelius,3 4 the
first case about President Obama's Affordable Care Act in
2012, SCOTUSblog had over 100,000 visitors. At least by one
account, even the White House was depending on the blog to
28 Id
29 Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV.
1901, 1916-19 (2016).
30 Mighell, supra note 16.
31 Rynkiewicz, supra note 5.
32 Jennifer Steinhauer, Polarized over Health Care, United on Drama of Rul-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012), https://nytimes.com/2012/06/25/us/politics/
on-left-and-right-a-frenzy-awaiting-health-care-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/
44WZ-EBZK].
33 Sara Kiff, For SCOTUS Blog, One GoaLt Beat Everybody and Break News of
Health Care Ruling, WASH. PosT (June 27, 2012), https://washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/for-scotusblog-one-goal-beat-everybody-and-break-news-of-
health-care-ruling/2012/06/27/gJQA1TZp7Vstory.html [https://perma.cc/
QL59-3PSH].
34 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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deliver the news to the President.3 5 SCOTUSblog also occupies
a prominent place in the production of case-specific legal anal-
ysis. SCOTUSblog's practice of hosting online symposia prior
to oral arguments in high-profile cases illustrates this phenom-
enon. For example, in Janus v. AFSCME,3 6 SCOTUSblog hosted
a symposium prior to oral argument that allowed scholars and
interested parties to elaborate and propose solutions to the
various problems the case presented.3 7 Such posts are well
researched, often with in-text hyperlinks to relevant cases.38
To the extent these posts are different from sections one might
find in legal briefs, it is surely much more in terms of format
than in substance.
Legal podcasting, although relatively new to the SCOTUS
coverage scene, has also surged in popularity. By our count,
there are now a dozen podcasts largely dedicated to covering
the Supreme Court.3 9 Some are hosted by former law clerks,4 0
some by academics,4 ' some by special interest groups42 and
some by journalists.4 3 Many of these podcasts welcome guests
35 Kiff, supra note 33 (quoting White House spokesman Jay Carney).
36 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
37 Special Feature: Symposium Before the Oral Argument in Janus v. AFSCME,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/symposia-
before-oral-arguments-during-october-term-2017/symposium-before-the-oral-
argument-in-janus-v-afscme/ [https://perma.cc/T278-SQXJ] (last visited Aug.
26, 2019). Interestingly, and as a sign of the influence of SCOTUSblog, one post
was authored by California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, who also filed an
amicus brief in the case on behalf of California. See Brief for the State of Califor-
nia Supporting Affirmance, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-
1466); Xavier Becerra & Aimee Feinberg, Symposium Agency Fees Benefit the
Workplace-Just Ask the States, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 22, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-agency-fees-benefit-workplace-Just-
ask-states/ [https://perma.cc/6Q9D-Q3KQ].
38 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk, Symposium: A Ruling for Plaintiffs Would Revive
Lochner, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 19, 2017, 2:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2017/12/symposium-ruling-plaintiffs-revive-lochner/ [https://perma.cc/QTW9-
6GCM] (containing in-depth research of labor-related cases).
39 Those podcasts are: Amicus, SLATE, supra note 3; Cases and Controversies,
BLOOMBERG L., supra note 8; Cato Daily Podcast, CATO INST., supra note 8; CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO SUP. CT., supra note 8; COUNTING TO 5, supra note 3; FIRST MONDAYS, supra
note 3; More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS, supra note 3; NewsHour Supreme Court
Podcast, PBS, supra note 8; REASON PODCAST, supra note 8; SCOTUScast, FED.
SoCY, supra note 3; SCOTUS 101, HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 3; We The People,
NAT'L CONST. CTR., supra note 8.
40 See, e.g., FIRST MONDAYS, supra note 3 (hosted by former Supreme Court
Clerks Dan Epps and Ian Samuel).
41 See, e.g., id.
42 See, e.g., Cato Daily Podcast, CATO INST., supra note 8 (hosted by the Cato
Institute and discussing libertarian thought).
43 See, e.g., Amicus, SLATE, supra note 3 (hosted by journalist Dahlia
Lithwick); More Perfect, WNYC STUDIOS, supra note 3 (hosted by journalist Jad
Abumrad).
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on their shows who have argued, or are about to argue, before
the Justices. And all of them discuss arguments in cases
pending before the Court. The missions vary somewhat, but
almost all legal podcasts are part entertainment and part edu-
cational. As one popular podcast covering the Court, First Mon-
days, describes it, the producers' goal is to discuss "upcoming
cases, break down the Term's major (and not-so-major) argu-
ments, analyze opinions, gossip about Court intrigue, and
make wildly inaccurate predictions.""
The power of podcasts and blogs to reach an audience is
then amplified by social media. The vast majority of bloggers,
podcast hosts, and online magazines also have Twitter ac-
counts, Facebook pages, and Instagram feeds.4 5 And-like eve-
ryone these days-these commentators use social media to
advertise and plug their work products.
Why does this matter? It matters because an entire gener-
ation of Americans-particularly young people-get their news
through social media. For example, 88% of Millennials report
getting their news from Facebook; younger Millennials say they
"let news find them" on social media like Twitter rather than
actively seek it out.4 6 Twenty years ago, a Court watcher would
read traditional newspapers and watch the six o'clock news to
learn about Supreme Court arguments; ten years ago, she
would load SCOTUSblog and read the New York Times online;
and today, she checks her Twitter feed to see what exciting
things bloggers and podcasters have to say in real time.
Perhaps for these reasons, virtual briefing at the Court is
now quite visible. For example, consider five cases the New
York Times labeled among "the biggest cases of 2018": Trump v.
Hawaii (the "travel ban" case);4 7 Janus v. AFSCME (the public
labor unions case) ;48 National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates v. Becerra (the case about crisis pregnancy centers in
California);49 Gill v. Whitford (the partisan gerrymandering
44 About, FIRST MONDAYS, http://firstmondays.fm/about- 1 [https://
perma.cc/UNT5-44SY].
45 Rynkiewicz, supra note 5 ("Most of the people who would have started a
blog 10 years ago are on social media now. The community has gone to Twitter,
but it's not the best source for discussion.").
46 How Millennials Get News: Inside the Habits of America's First Digital Gen-
eration, Am. PRESS INST. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://americanpressinstitute.org/pub-
lications/reports/survey-research/mllennials-news/ (https://perma.cc/R3EE-
BN9H].
47 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
48 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
49 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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case);50 and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Conmission of
Civil Rights5 1 (the case about the baker who refused to bake a
cake for a gay couple).52
For all five of these cases, a "virtual briefing" docket-if
there were such a thing-would be very long. Each case, as the
following charts show, generated dozens of qualifying blogposts
and podcasts:
FIGURE 1. SAMPLE OF BLOG POSTING IN OT 2017
* Number of blogs that make an argument posted within one week
of oral argument
: Number of blogs that make an argument posted at other times
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50 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
51 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
52 See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, The Supreme Court's Biggest Deci-
sions of 2018, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2018/06/18/us/politics/supreme-court-decisions.html [https://perma.cc/
QJA4-JJAP].
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FIGURE 2. SAMPLE OF PODCASTS IN OT 2017
a Number of blogs that make an argument posted within one week
of oral argument
* Number of blogs that make an argument posted at other times
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To take some highlights, the Janus case about public un-
ions inspired ninety-five blog posts and fifteen podcasts that all
presented advocacy-meaning case-related arguments-before
the case was decided. This included an interview on the Rea-
son podcast with the plaintiff, Mark Janus, and another one
with his attorney, William Messenger, on the Federalist Society
Podcast.53 The numbers are even more dramatic for the Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop case. For that case, we found 110 blog posts
and fourteen podcasts making an argument about the case
before it was decided. Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece,
really made the rounds, giving interviews on a Christian pod-
cast the week of argument in addition to making an appear-
ance on The View.
Most of those advocacy pieces-typically more than half-
were written in the seven days surrounding oral argument, a
time when the Justices are likely most engaged with the is-
sues.54 And within that sensitive week, we also found in-
stances where attorneys in the case actually appeared on
53 Reason Podcast: Mark Janus Doesn't Want to Join a Union, REASON (May 31,
2018), http://reason.com/archives/2018/05/31/mark-janus-doesnt-want-to-
join [https://perma.cc/S65Q-ZN8V]; Janus in the Court, FED. Soc'Y (Sept. 19,
2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/podcasts/anus-in-the-court-podcast
[https://perma.cc/KNR4-K7Ky].
54 For Janus, 60% of the blogs and 47% of the podcasts appeared the week of
oral argument. For Masterpiece, those numbers were 36% and 50%. For Thimp v.
Hawaii, 55% of the blogs and 54% of the podcasts appeared within seven days of
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podcasts to expand on material they left out of their official
argument in the courtroom.5 5
But it is certainly more than the actual advocates who use
virtual briefing to target the Justices- The blogs and podcasts
also feature prominent academics,5 6 Supreme Court advocates
who are well known to the Court but were not otherwise in-
volved in the case,5 7 guests who filed amicus briefs in the
case,58 and those who have no official connection but champi-
oned the cause for a political party or other interest group.5 9
Further, although not exactly a space for refined argument,
Twitter is used significantly in high-proffle cases such as
these-particularly during the week the case is argued. Some-
times the podcast and blogger hosts will tweet to advertise
recent posts or episodes, and sometimes the advocacy will just
appear in the Tweet itself. Tweets from prominent bloggers
argument. For Gill v. Whitford, the numbers were 34% and 58%, respectively.
And for Becerra, they were 47% and 80%.
55 See generally Who is the River Master?, FIRST MONDAYS, supra note 10
(discussing Gill v. Whitford and featuring Misha Tseytlin, who argued for the
state).
56 See generally Michael Dorf, SCOTUS Travel Ban Post Mortem, DORF ON L.
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/04/scotus-travel-argument-
post-mortem.html [https://perma.cc/3WGW-ETXX] (pointing out where he
thought the advocate in the case missed opportunities).
57 See, e.g., Amicus: Don't Call it an Abortion Case, with Guests Walter Dellin-
ger and Priscilla Smith, SIATE (Mar. 31 2018), http://www.slate.com/articles/
podcasts/amicus/2018/03/crisispregnancy-centers and-whylarsneedlaw
yerstoo.html [https://perma.cc/LL55-N6RQ] (discussing NIFLA v. Becerra);
Courthouse Steps: National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, with
Guest Michael Moreland, FED. Soc'Y (Mar. 20, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/events/
courthouse-steps-national-institute-of-family-and-life-advocates-v-becerra
[https://perma.cc/3QwZ-2CCY]; Should Public-Sector Workers Be Forced to Pay
Union Fees? A Preview of Janus v. American, with Guests Raymond LaJeunesse
Jr., Donald B. Verrilli Jr., and Ilya Shapiro, CATO INST. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://
www.cato.org/events/should-public-sector-workers-be-forced-pay-union-fees-
preview-janus-v-american-federation [https://perma.cc/UD89-597F] (discussing
Janus v. AFSCME).
58 See, e.g., National Security Council Official, Joshua Geitzer on Supreme
Court Travel Ban, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/
55176/security-podcast-national-security-council-hawall-travel-ban-osh-
geltzer-discusses-trump-hawaii/ [https://perma.cc/WKC3-U8T7] (featuring
Josh Geltzer, one of fifty-two former national security officials who submitted an
amicus brief in the travel ban case).
59 The aforementioned VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, supra note 2, is a well-trafficked
blog advancing conservative and libertarian causes. BALKINIZATION, supra note 7,
on the other end of the spectrum, is a liberal blog. Both blogs have been credited
with "influencling] the business of the Court"-from the challenges to the Afforda-
ble Care Act (Volokh Conspiracy) to the government's treatment of suspected
terrorists (Balkinization). See Vincent James Strickler, The Supreme Court and
New Media Technologies, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 61, 73-74 (Richard Davis ed., 2014).
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around the time of oral argument in the travel ban case, for
example, included phrases like "not the next Korematsu"6 0 or
"POTUS can't act with anti-Muslim animus."6 1 It is even be-
coming more common to engage in a sort of "supplemental
tweeting" shorty after oral argument-offering online answers
to the Justices' questions during the "sweet spot" of their con-
sideration of the case (as they head back to chambers reflecting
on the argument and deciding how to vote a day or two later in
conference).62
Interestingly, it is not unusual for those who engage in
virtual briefing to then be recruited to write official briefs as
well. The "Dellinger brief," as the Justices called it in the case
about California's same-sex marriage ban in 2013, originated
as a piece by Walter Dellinger in Slate that was then turned
into an amicus brief-a brief many credit with changing the
result in the case.63 As Dick Howard has explained, the first
constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act in 2012 was
not taken seriously until bloggers on the Volokh Conspiracy
began fleshing out the argument that the law's individual man-
date exceeded Congress' power.64 These bloggers then filed an
amicus brief to the Court repeating these claims-claims that
60 @BzationBlog, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://twitter.com/Bza-
tionBlog/status/988217600499994630 [https://perma.ce/3S42-4WDXI.
61 @ShallTakeCare, TWITIER (Apr. 17, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://twitter.com/
ShallTakeCare/status/986289460122996736 [https://perma.cc/USM8-56XF].
62 See, e.g., @katie-eyer, TwlTrER (Oct. 9, 2019, 1:43 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/katie-eyer/status/ 1182033896319459328 [https://perma.cc/G4ZA-
75GW] ("The Supreme Court heard the LGBT Title VII cases yesterday, asking the
question of whether anti-LGBT discrimination is necessarily also 'because of sex.'
Here are my thoughts on oral argument . . . .").
63 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S.
693 (2013) (No. 12-144); Walter Dellinger, No Harm, No Standing, SLATE (Dec. 11,
2012) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/12/the-california-gay-mar-
riage-case-no-one-has-standing-to-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/BBQ2-3UV2];
see also Adam Liptak, Justices Say Time May Be Wrong for Gay Marriage Case,
N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/supreme-
court-same-sex-marriage-case.html [https://perma.cc/5QWW-9HLY] (discussing
the Justices' concerns about standing during oral argument). In that brief and
Slate piece, Dellinger (a prominent Supreme Court litigator) argued that there was
no standing in the case, which of course is the ultimate resolution the Court
reached.
64 A.E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L.
REV. 231, 282-83 (2015) ("As challenges to the Affordable Care Act's individual
mandate began to work their way through the federal courts, most legal profes-
sionals and academics considered arguments against the mandate to be 'simply
crazy.' The Volokh Conspiracy, however, provided a forum for conservative legal
scholars to develop arguments against the individual mandate, helping to break
down the perception of expert consensus on the constitutional issues in play."
(footnote omitted)).
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played a large role at oral argument and, according to some,
strongly influenced how the Chief Justice saw the case.65
In both of those examples, of course, the questions from
the Justices at oral argument came from an official brief, not
the online version of the argument. This seems to imply that
the Justices are still hesitant to actually cite blogs and pod-
casts as their source of information (an interesting observation
in and of itself that we will explore below).66 But regardless of
the form the argument took at the end of the day, the momen-
tum for those claims came by way of advocacy outside of the
traditional briefing process-part of the crowdsourcing dy-
namic of virtual briefing.
B. The Virtual Briefing Spectrum
Of course, not all blogs and podcasts are the same. And
one's normative assessment of virtual briefing might well vary
with the level of detail and analysis each piece of advocacy
presents, as well as the degree to which any given virtual brief
might serve worthwhile purposes other than attempting to in-
fluence the Court. It is perhaps helpful, therefore, to imagine a
virtual briefing spectrum.
On one end of the spectrum is what one might call a "deep
dive" legal blog post-a written piece of advocacy that walks the
walk and talks the talk of legal analysis. These blog pieces are
much the same as traditional briefs or even law review articles
(with running citations instead of detailed footnotes). They are
long; they anticipate counterarguments; they back up claims
with empirical support; and they unpack a complex legal argu-
ment in a careful way. A good modem example of a "deep dive"
version of virtual briefing would be the commentary on Lawfare
analyzing controversies surrounding the Mueller investigation
or the series of historical "deep dive podcasts" on the same site
tracking the Supreme Court's decisions on military commis-
sions.67 Indeed, these posts or podcasts appear on websites
65 Id. at 283.
66 Indeed, a quick Westlaw search reveals only one citation to a blog in a
majority opinion-a citation to a White House blog for stories of those who won
the Medal of Honor. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012).
67 See, e.g., blog posts by Ryan Goodman, Alex Whiting, Marty Lederman,
Walter Dellinger, and Bob Bauer at Lawfare, Take Care, and Just Security. See
also Robert Chesney & Steve Vladeck, The National Security Law Podcast: A Deep
Dive Into the History of Military Commissions, LAwFARE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/national-security-law-podcast-deep-dive-history-military-
commissions [https://perma.cc/GEB2-FUDY] (featuring a series of conversations
which they call "deep dive" and "the deepest dive").
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proclaiming their purposes: they are often labeled as "in depth
analysis"68 or "deep dives," distinguishing them from other la-
bels on the site such as "quick reactions."69
A few features about deep dive blog posts are worth noting.
First, the arguments they put forward could easily be turned
into legal briefs or scholarship (and, indeed, some of them ac-
tually are transformed into law review articles without much
effort).70 Second, even if these posts are not destined for formal
filing or publication, these arguments are cited as authorities
in other legal briefs and law reviews.7 ' Third, these longer
posts are often written as a series-reflecting deliberation that
occurs over time-or as a "conversation" between two commen-
tators with differing views.72 And finally, many of these "deep
dives" are inspired by issues that will reach the Supreme
Court, but are not posted simultaneously with a pending case.
Of course, it is important to remember that even if these "deep
dive" blog posts feel reminiscent of evidence and arguments put
through the regular adversarial system, they still differ from
traditional briefing in that they are originating outside of the
parties before the Court and subject to different incentives (i.e.,
prestige, the fun of participation in Supreme Court decision-
making) along the way.
At the other end of the spectrum are what might be called
"hot takes." A "hot take" is a journalistic term to describe "a
quickly produced, strongly worded, and often deliberately pro-
vocative or sensational opinion or reaction."7 3 It is of immedi-
ate interest (generally concerning current headlines) and often
68 See generally Recent Posts on Take Care Blog, TAKE CARE, https://take
careblog.com/recent?blogCategory=326F1DC5-79DO-4FA6-BDB32 1E97604D7
5D [https://perma.cc/R3BF-B5BEI (last accessed Aug. 17, 2019) (sorting blog
posts by "In-Depth Analysis").
69 See generally Recent Posts on Take Care Blog, TAKE CARE https://take-
careblog.com/recent?blogCategory=37B8A539-4C8A-41AD-9684625B7874BD
46 [https://perma.cc/UU28-7P2R] (last accessed Aug. 17, 2019) (sorting blog
posts by "Quick Reactions").
70 See, e.g., Andrew Crespo, Impeachment as Punishment, 13 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 101 579 (2019) (originally published as a blog post and transformed into an
article).
71 For discussion of this phenomenon in courts generally, see Lee F. Peoples,
The Citation of Blogs in Judicial Opinions, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 39
(2010). For discussion of specific examples, see infra subpart II.C.
72 See, e.g., Richard Primus, More on the Unprincipled Nature of the Senate,
Further Conversation with Professor Dorf TAKE CARE (Nov. 28, 2018), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/more-on-the-unprincipled-nature-of-the-senate-further-
conversation-with-professor-dorf [https://perma.cc/8EDY-DY5E] (conversation
between Richard Primus and Mike Dorf about the nature of the Senate).
73 See Hot Take, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/hot/o2Otakeary/hot%2Otake [https://perma.cc/N9UY-RYMD].
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deliberately provocative and designed to attract attention.
Twitter-with its character limitation and vast distribution po-
tential-is a perfect home for "hot take" legal analysis, al-
though it is not necessarily the only home.
A "hot take" is not typically a term of endearment; it is seen
as a by-product of economic incentives that drive online jour-
nalism and it is certainly a form of "journalistic slur."74 But
those who defend "hot take journalism" do so for reasons simi-
lar to the ones that make "virtual briefing" so attractive. There
is so much information out there on the Internet now, the
argument goes, that the need for commentators to sift through
it is critical. The digital reader needs a translator-someone to
"mak[e] arguments about what matters, [and] how to under-
stand it[.]" 7 5 The "hot take" form of virtual briefing, therefore,
can be seen as a convenient sorting device-leading consumers
to arguments they will likely find compelling from voices they
have heard before (and thus exacerbating confirmation bias).
The middle of the virtual briefing spectrum is where things
get especially tricky. Many blog posts or podcasts do not fit
either the "deep dive" or "hot take" molds; they tend to share
features of both. These arguments prize cleverness over thor-
oughness and speed over deliberation, but that may be be-
cause they are targeted at a different audience. For example,
Orin Kerr-a well-respected criminal procedure scholar-has
regularly produced "quick takes" in the form of blogs and pod-
casts issued from "the courthouse steps" that react immedi-
ately to claims made in oral argument (and are then tweeted
and posted on Facebook within seconds).7 6
Podcasts perhaps also fall in this middle area of the spec-
trum and are worth considering separately. Unlike blogging,
podcasts involve oral communication-part legal advocacy
mixed with entertainment and story-telling. This is a valuable
service, to be sure, but there is also a generally accepted value
to legal analysis that comes when one sits down to write.7 7
74 Julia Turner, In Defense of the Take, SLATE (Apr. 10, 2015), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/04/buzzfeed-dove-ad-post-ben-smith-
doesnt-like-hot-takes-but-are-takes-really-all-that-bad.html [https://perma.cc/
6VMZ-NCHT].
75 Id.
76 See Orin Kerr, The Carpenter Argument: Quick Video Reactions on Twitter
and on Facebook Live, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/carpenter-argument-quick-video-reactions-twitter-and-facebook-live
[https://perma.cc/UPM2-P8EV].
77 There is a rich literature on the virtues and philosophical underpinnings of
the practice of giving reasons in judicial opinions. See Martin Shapiro, The Giving
Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179; see also Mathilde Cohen, The
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Perhaps this is why the Justices say that arguments are gener-
ally won or lost on the briefs (indeed, Justice Thomas says oral
argument is not "the real meat" of a case),78 and why empiri-
cists have shown that "highly charged emotional language" in a
brief is less likely to win a Justice's vote.7 9 Sitting down to
back up one's thoughts on paper is a different exercise than
orally presenting those views in an entertaining way for a pod-
cast audience.8 0 This claim is not to denigrate podcasts, but
just to establish when it comes to producing hard-core legal
analysis-the type of work that is valued within the adversary
system-the pen (or keyboard) may be mightier than the
microphone.
II
Is ANYBODY AT THE CouRT LISTENING?
None of this should raise any alarm bells unless there is
reason to suspect hat the key players are paying attention and
allowing virtual briefing to affect their decision-making. But,
as it turns out, there are reasons to suspect hat the Justices-
and their law clerks-are listening, and it is that connection to
the Court that makes virtual briefing worthy of careful
consideration.
A. Law Clerks on Twitter
No Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court has an official
Facebook page or Twitter presence or blogging persona. Moreo-
ver, the Chief Justice has explained that he advises the law
clerks to "put all that on hold" when they start to clerk at the
Court.8 1 But even if the law clerks take a break from updating
their Facebook statuses, they are still paying attention to the
Rule of Law as the Rule of Reasons, 96 ARCHIVES FOR PHIL. L. & SOCIAL PHIL. 1
(2010); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
78 Tony Mauro, Courtside: When Planets Collide, LEG. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at
10.
79 Sarah Escalante et al., An Empirical Analysis of Emotional Language in
Legal Briefs Before the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 22, 2015, 1:52 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/an-empirical-analysis-of-emotional-lan-
guage-in-legal-briefs-before-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/K8JQ-
FrDY].
80 See Stephen Stark, Law Schools Must Teach Writing as Discrete Skill, LEG.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1983, at 14.
81 Strickler, supra note 59, at 70 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts: "I sit down
with incoming clerks at the beginning of the year, as soon as we get back, and go
through a number of things they have to be aware of. . . . I tell them that they
obviously shouldn't be tweeting about what they're doing[.]").
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online briefing and advocacy that surrounds the cases on the
docket.
This should not come as a surprise. For one thing, a typi-
cal law clerk is about twenty-six years old and very used to
getting his or her information from social media. For another
thing, law students are now taught in their legal writing classes
to "Google" cases before beginning their briefs. And particu-
larly at the certiorari stage when a law clerk is authoring a
memo for multiple Justices of the Supreme Court and tasked
with determining whether an issue is of national importance,
canvassing the blogs and the podcasts seems like a natural
first step. And one place where all of this activity is open to the
public .. . is Twitter.
Because Twitter accounts are publicly available-meaning
it is easy to see who is following whom on Twitter-we were able
to document Twitter traffic from Supreme Court law clerks
(whose names we could identify through the website Above the
Law).8 2 We looked for Twitter accounts of the law clerks serv-
ing in the 2017-18 Term and the 2018-19 Term. This means
we tracked Twitter traffic from law clerks from June 2017-De-
cember 2018, but only while the law clerks were serving as
clerks.
Not all of the law clerks had identifiable Twitter accounts.
But a surprising number were active on Twitter during the time
they clerked at the Court. Twenty-five law clerks (out of sixty-
seven total law clerks for the two Terms, so 37%) had Twitter
accounts we could verify. And, out of those twenty-five identifi-
able law clerk Twitter accounts, twenty-one of them (84%) fol-
low legal podcasts, blogs, and other sources of "virtual briefing"
at the Court.8 3 These numbers are conservative estimates
82 See David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch, ABOVE L. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/supreme-court-clerk-hiring-watch-october-
term-2017-is-done-lets-tum-to-2018 [https://perma.cc/R2PF-GMN8].
83 A few words on our "twitter methodology," which is surprisingly straight-
forward. After obtaining the law clerk names from the Above the Law website, we
typed the names into the "search" bar on Twitter. At the same time, we typed the
clerk's name into Google to obtain a picture of the clerk. Most of the time, Google
linked us to the clerk's Linkedin proffile, or an article from the clerk's law school
congratulating the clerk for their Supreme Court clerkship, that contained a
picture of the clerk. Once searching via name on Twitter, we scrolled through the
suggestions under the "People" tab. We clicked on every account that looked like
the photo acquired from Google. Once selecting a specific account, we clicked the
"Following" tab to see what accounts the clerk was following. We looked to the
clerk's proffle picture, location, and followers (whether the clerk follows his or her
law school) to verify that the account belongs to the Supreme Court clerk. After
confirming that we had the right account, we could document which people,
podcasts, and blogs the law clerks were following.
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on the left. And podcasts and bloggers considered conserva-
tive-like the Federalist Society podcast or Reason (a liberta-
rian online magazine and blog)-are likewise followed by law
clerks who work in conservative chambers.8 6
To be sure, the fact that law clerks are listening to virtual
briefing on Twitter does not prove that their bosses are also
paying attention.8 7 And yet there are separate reasons to sus-
pect the Justices themselves are consuming this online dia-
logue. It is to that indirect evidence that we now turn.
B. The Power of Elite Opinion
According to Dahlia Lithwick, the "Justices are really grap-
pling with the Internet right now... [.] There's a sense of being
instantly judged... [.] They all have their clerks print out the
blogs."8 8 Justice Kennedy, at least, is actually on record saying
that he directs his clerks to follow the blogs.8 9 In an interview
with the Wall Street Journal, Justice Kennedy gave a little in-
sight as to why. He explained that law professors are more
relevant to him now in an age of blogging:
Professors are back in the act with the blogs. Orin Kerr, one
of my former clerks, with criminal procedure [and] the in-
ternet area, Mike Dorf, Jack Goldsmith. So the professors
within 72 hours have a comment on the court opinion, which
is helpful, and they are beginning to comment on when the
certs are granted. And I like that.90
It seems there is a growing sense that the Justices are
keenly aware of the input and judgments coming instantane-
ously from blogs and other legal commentators.
Once again, this stands to reason. While Justices come to
the Court as seasoned lawyers and from the top of the profes-
86 All of our Twitter data is on file with the authors and has been verified by
the editors of the Cornell Law Review. Although it was all obtained through
publicly available sources, we declined to publish the details in order to respect
the privacy of the law clerks.
87 Of course, this Twitter research indicates only that the law clerks are
following legal commentators; we cannot definitely prove the clerks are reading
the commentators' posts.
88 Strickler, supra note 59, at 74 (quoting Dahlia Lithwick, Journalists Green-
house and Lithwick Discuss How the Internet has Affected Supreme Court Report-
ing, YALE L. SCHOOL (Oct. 27, 2010), www.yale.edu/news/12392 [https://
perma.cc/D249-KU52]).
89 Jess Bravin, Justice Kennedy on Law School, Blogging, and Popular Cul-
ture, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2013), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/10/jus-
tice-kennedy-on-law-school-blogging-and-popular-culture/ [https://perma.cc/
CD6D-ALBU].
90 Id.
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sion, they have more substantive expertise in certain areas
compared to others. Some have little to no experience with
certain fields-say, criminal law or bankruptcy-outside wear-
ing a robe and hearing appellate arguments. If someone whom
the Justice knows, or at least is inclined to trust, offers views,
identifies pitfalls, or suggests how to resolve a case, it is hard
for the Justices not to at least listen. (All the more so for the
young clerks pondering how to advise their bosses.)
Furthermore, as scholars like Neal Devins and Larry Baum
have persuasively demonstrated, elite opinion matters a great
deal to the Justices.9 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist once remarked
that he and his colleagues "go home at night and read the
newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk
to their family and friends about current events" and, conse-
quently, cannot "escape being influenced by public opinion."92
According to Devins and Baum, the "public opinion" to
which Rehnquist refers is not "average Joe public opinion," but
the opinion of the Justices' peer groups-law professors, mem-
bers of the Supreme Court bar, former clerks, and the like.93
And this emphasis on what Baum and Devins call "elite opin-
ion" is easy to explain: "Like others, Supreme Court Justices
want most to be liked and respected by people to whom they
are personally close and people with whom they identify. For
the Justices, those people are overwhelmingly part of elite
groups," including certain public interest groups and law
schools.94
It is not a large leap from that conclusion to predict that
the Justices are paying keen attention to what these elite audi-
91 See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEo. L.J. 1515, 1555-60, 1566-74 (2010);
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Scl. 635, 649-50, 655-58, 660-61 (1992); Freder-
ick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627-30 (2000).
92 Baum & Devins, supra note 91, at 1520.
93 Id. at 1537-38 ("Beyond their close personal circles, the Justices interact
with people who are part of specific elite groups in American society. On the
whole, the most salient group-more accurately, a set of interconnected groups-
is the legal profession. Justices were trained in the law, and most spent a high
proportion of their pre-appointment careers working in the law. As Justices, they
work most closely with other lawyers. Thus, the Justices have good reason to care
about how they are regarded by other lawyers. Further, those legal profession-
als-especially fellow judges and legal academics-perform the most intensive
evaluations of the Justices' voting behaviors and judicial opinions. This attentive-
ness to the Justices' work, combined with the salience of the legal profession to
the Justices, makes members of that profession an important audience for mem-
bers of the Supreme Court." (footnote omitted)).
94 Id. at 1537, 1580.
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ences think about the pending cases. Such monitoring allows
the Justices to make themselves as fully informed as possible
about pending cases. It also allows them to forecast their com-
ing evaluation in the blogosphere.
There is certainly an upside to this-one explored more
thoroughly below. There is value in exchanging ideas with
others, particularly friends and peers. Put differently, the Jus-
tices may look to their peers not just for approval, but also for
help in answering tricky questions. There is comfort in the
familiar. And, like the rest of us, the Justices may be turning
to sources they trust for help in answering the most difficult
questions they must address. We do not mean to scorn that
dynamic. To the extent we fear the Justices are captured in a
bubble and cut off from the real world, perhaps we want them
to have an avenue-a publicly accessible avenue-to explore
their questions and concerns.
But the point for now is a descriptive one: that the Justices'
questions and concerns-once focused exclusively on the advo-
cates or maybe amici-are now being crowdsourced to a wider
group, an elite group of legal professionals, in a context com-
pletely outside the traditional briefing rules.
This is a change from the days when Chief Justice Rehn-
quist went home to watch the six o'clock news coverage of his
Court. Now the feedback from the audience the Court cares
most about is accessible instantly, can be tailor-made to the
issue and the case at hand, and comes from an almost endless
supply of interested and familiar parties. It is for this reason
that the "crowdsourcing" analogy seems apt. Crowdsourcing is
a modern way to solve problems by asking one's peers on social
media to weigh in with their opinions (How to get a crayon stain
out of a couch? Where is the best Mexican restaurant in
town?).95 With the rise of virtual briefing, pending Supreme
Court decisions, we think, are being crowdsourced among the
Justice's peer group-the "elite opinion" that matters most to
them.
C. Cases in which Virtual Briefing at Least Arguably Made
a Difference
Does any of this actually matter at the end of the day?
While we obviously cannot prove virtual briefing changes out-
comes at the Court (and thus we make no causation claims),
95 See Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/crowdsourcing [https://perma.cc/P46B-QQW5) (last accessed
Aug. 17, 2019).
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we do offer below some anecdotal examples where advocacy
outside the traditional briefing process seemed to make a dif-
ference in the questions asked by the Justices at oral argument
or answered in their opinions.
Perhaps the most familiar example of virtual briefing is the
"broccoli horrible" from NFIB v. Sebelius, the case involving the
Commerce Clause challenge to the Affordable Care Act's indi-
vidual mandate to buy health insurance.9 6 The now well-
known argument goes like this: if Congress could force us to
buy health insurance because it is good for us, they could also
force us to eat broccoli, which would be a liberty crisis. The
analogy gained popularity from conservative legal bloggers on
the Volokh Conspiracy blog. In the words of Dick Howard, the
Volokh blog "provided a forum for conservative legal scholars to
develop arguments against the individual mandate, helping to
break down the perception of expert consensus on the consti-
tutional issues in play."9 7
The broccoli horrible, in other words, was an important
part of "virtual briefing" for the first ACA challenge; it came
largely from outside the traditional adversarial process. The
word "broccoli" does not appear in any of the party briefs in the
Sebelius case or in the Eleventh Circuit opinion being reviewed
by the Court. It is indeed only mentioned in one sentence on
one page by one amicus brief filed by the Michigan Legal Ser-
vices.9 8 And yet, the analogy made quite an impact on the
case. Justice Scalia specifically invoked the analogy at oral
argument,9 9 the word "broccoli" was used twelve times in the
Supreme Court opinions, and the analogy made an appearance
in each of the three main opinions addressing Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. 100
According to many observers, in fact, the broccoli horrible
analogy was a game-changer in the litigation. 0 1 In the words
of Jack Balkin, the challenge went from "off the wall" (meaning
most legal commentators thought it was flatly wrong) to "on the
wall" (capable of causing legal change).10 2 Indeed, Orin Kerr
96 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
97 Howard, supra note 63, at 283.
98 Brief of Michigan Legal Services, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 37, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-393).
99 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (No. 11-
393).
100 See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 558, 608, 615, 617, 660 (men-
tioning "broccoli").
101 See Howard, supra note 64, at 282-83.
102 Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Chal-
lenge Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
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predicted in 2010 that there was "a less than one-per-cent
chance that the courts will invalidate the individual man-
date."'0 3 But he changed his tune by the time of the argu-
ment-estimating the chances at "fifty-fifty" on the eve of the
Supreme Court decision.10 4
A similar "virtual briefing" success story-or almost suc-
cess story-concerns the federalism argument in United States
v. Windsor.0 5 At issue in that case was the Defense of Marriage
Act-a law that defined "marriage" as being between a man and
a woman for the purposes of federal law. The case was princi-
pally briefed as a case about equality and gay rights. An alter-
native argument-that he law was an overreach by the federal
government into the sovereign power of the states-was a late-
breaking claim championed by outsiders.
By our assessment, the federalism arguments were origi-
nally found only in the appendix attached to the certiorari peti-
tion filed at the Court; they were absent entirely from the
opening briefs in the case.106 The federalism argument did not
actually make its way into the party briefing until the Biparti-
san Legal Advisory Group filed its supplemental brief on Janu-
ary 23, 2013-and even then it was only mentioned in ten of
the fifty-nine pages and did not generate a response from either
the United States or Windsor in the reply briefs. 0 7 The main
advocates for a federalism outcome in Windsor were not the
government or the parties to the lawsuit (both of whom were
represented by top-notch, extremely experienced Supreme
Court advocates),108 but rather by academics Ernie Young,
Randy Barnett, and Jonathan Adler, who consistently blogged
about this theory and filed an amicus brief making the same
argument.109
national/archive/20 12/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-
challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https://perma.cc/KWV3-9APJ].
103 Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/25/unpopular-mandate [https://
perma.cc/P8ST-T2UJ].
104 Id.
05 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
106 The only mention of "federalism" in the early party briefs appears in the
appendix attached to the petition for cert and the opening briefs.
107 See Brief on the Merits for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the United States House of Representatives, Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (No. 12-307).
108 Don Verrilli represented the United States and Paul Clement represented
the parties defending the law. Verrilli and Clement are hardly rookie lawyers
likely to miss an obvious way to resolve the case.
109 See Jeffrey Rosen, Flip-Flopping Federalists, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2013),
https: / /newrepublic.com/article/ 112800/supreme-court-doma-case-federal-
ism-comes-back-haunt-conservatives [https://perma.cc/7TRT-KMWT] (attribut-
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Yet, despite not being featured in the main briefs, the fed-
eralism argument made a prominent appearance both when
the case was argued and in the final opinion. Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia all asked pointed
questions about whether the law violated states' rights.o1 0 In-
deed, at least one observer after oral argument noted that the
advocates seemed ambushed by the states-rights angle-de-
spite its prominence in arguments from conservative scholars
on blogs.I' As Dale Carpenter recounted later:
Overnight, it seems, federalism has become a major ground
on which the Defense of Marriage Act is being contested.
This is surprising because, as we saw Wednesday . .. there
were no real advocates for federalism as an issue during the
oral argument in United States v. Windsor. No advocates,
that is, except for five of the nine people sitting behind the
bench.112
A more recent example of briefing from outside players that
seemed to make an impact on the final result comes from the
ing the federalism argument to Ernie Young); George F. Will, DOMA Infringes on
States' Rights, WASH. PosT (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/george-f-will-doma-infringes-on-states-rights/2013/03/20/fa845348-
90bb- 1 1e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html?utm erm=.91fd5ef545aa [https://
perma.cc/PT9A-E5YU] (same). For examples of the blogging efforts that accompa-
nied the amicus brief, see Michael Ramsey, Federalism and the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013, 6:25 AM), https://originalismblog.
typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/03/federalism-and-the-defense-of-
marriage-actmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/J4KV-S4E7] and Ilya Sha-
piro, Supreme Court Could Also Strike Down DOMA on Federalism Grounds, CATO
INST. (Mar. 5, 2013, 11:05 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-court-
could-also-strike-down-doma-federalism-grounds [https://perma.cc/8UQZ-
TPAYI.
110 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, 81-82, 97-98, Windsor, 570 U.S.
744 (No. 12-307).
111 See Rosen, supra note 109 ("The fact that the conservative justices would
be interested in the argument that DOMA violates states' rights shouldn't have
come as a surprise. Last week, George F. Will wrote a column in the Washington
Post concluding that 'DOMA is an abuse of federalism' because it is not '"neces-
sary and proper" for the exercise of a constitutionally enumerated congressional
power.' Will cited an amicus brief filed by federalism scholars, including Randy
Barnett, the intellectual architect of the constitutional challenge to Obamacare,
that made an argument similar to the one Barnett had made in the health care
case: There is a 'difference between a government with a general police power and
a government of limited and enumerated powers,' the scholars write. In the Su-
preme Court oral argument, Justices Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia, seemed to be
asking questions directly from the federalism scholars' brief.").
112 Dale Carpenter, Three Senses in Which DOMA Implicates Federalism,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:54 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/29/
three-senses-in-which-doma-implicates-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/FMZ2-
BBJ6]. Only four of the Justices signed on to the federalism argument, but five
expressed interest in it at oral argument.
112
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Masterpiece Cakeshop decision announced in June 2018.113
The result in the case was not a shock; most court watchers
had predicted a win for the cake-baker and not for the gay
couple who sued alleging discrimination. But the argument at
the heart of the majority opinion was a bit of a dark horse in a
horse race of Supreme Court briefing. Although the case had
been briefed as a case about the freedom of expression in cake-
baking and the boundaries of that expression as it bumps into
antidiscrimination laws, Justice Kennedy's opinion focused in-
stead on the narrow issue of the hostility towards religion
shown by this particular administrator in this particular case.
This religious hostility argument did not appear anywhere
in the lower court opinion other than a single footnote, and it
played a very minor role in the party briefs (totaling less than
five pages across all the briefs).114 Indeed, out of the ninety-five
amicus briefs filed in the case, the hostility argument can be
found in just four-for a total of twenty-nine pages of the ap-
proximately 2,500 pages of amicus briefing.' 15
Where did Justice Kennedy find this religious hostility ar-
gument? It is possible, of course, that the Justice or a re-
sourceful, dedicated law clerk found the needle of this
argument in the haystack of other arguments before the court.
We think it more likely, however, that the religious hostility
argument was brought to Justice Kennedy's attention through
virtual briefing. Specifically, twenty-four hours before oral ar-
gument in Masterpiece, the Heritage Foundation-a conserva-
tive think tank-posted a report about the religious hostility
from the state agency on its website."6
113 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
114 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App.
2015); Brief for Petitioners at 39-44, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No.
16-111).
115 Brief of Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 12-18, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Liberty Counsel in Support of Petitioner at 13-16, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111); Brief of North Carolina Values Coalition & the
Family Research Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 29, Master-
piece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111); Brief of William Jack & the National
Center for Law and Policy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1-15,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
116 John Malcolm & Emilie Kao, Enforcing Tolerance Through Intolerance: Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop, Free Speech, and Religious Liberty, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 4,
2017), https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/enforcing-tolerance-
through-intolerance-masterpiece-cakeshop-free-speech [ ttps://perma.cc/
K36D-FHZC] ("Similarly, during a public hearing, a Colorado Civil Rights Com-
missioner told Jack Phillips, 'Freedom of religion and religion has been used to
justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
113
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:85
In its post, the Heritage Foundation specifically highlighted
what it called hostile language the baker faced from one partic-
ular Colorado agency office-language that makes the point
that freedom of religion arguments had been used to justify all
kinds of historical discrimination in the past, including the
Holocaust.1 17 Justice Kennedy asked specifically about this
claim at oral argument-quoting the same record source the
Heritage Foundation quoted and focusing on the same lan-
guage from one of the seven state actors."
Certain patterns about virtual briefing begin to emerge as
one continues to dig. The Justices tend to look to friendly
voices for virtual briefing-particularly their former law clerks.
As noted, Justice Kennedy has said publicly that he looks to
blogging from his former clerks Mike Dorf, Orin Kerr, and Jack
Goldsmith."9 Justice Thomas, too, seems to emphasize argu-
ments that come from kindred spirits. His concurrence in
Trump v. Hawaii, for example, borrowed heavily from argu-
ments made by conservative scholar Sam Bray against national
injunctions. Indeed, Bray had blogged specifically at Volokh
about how that argument related to the entry ban case in a way
that tracks the logic laid out in Justice Thomas' concur-
rence.12 0 Similarly, in Lucia v. SEC, Justice Thomas wrote sep-
whether it be the [Hiolocaust. . . . [Wie can list hundreds of situations where
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion
to hurt others.' The State's hostility toward Jack Phillips' religious beliefs is unde-
niable." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
117 See id.
118 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 52-53, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
119 Bravin, supra note 89.
120 On the Volokh Conspiracy, Bray wrote that "the Constitution gives the
federal courts 'the judicial Power'-that is a power to decide 'cases' for particular
litigants." Samuel Bray, Whose Case? Whose Remedy? Thoughts on the Travel
Ban Injunctions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 5, 2017, 11:58 AM), https://rea-
son. com/volokh/ 2017/06/05/whose-case-whose-remedy-though [ ttps://
perma.ce/HHR4-FTQX. In Justice Thomas' concurrence: "For most of our his-
tory, courts understood judicial power as 'fundamentall[y] the power to render
judgments in individual cases.'" Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2427 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
Bray also wrote, "And for the first 170 years of the federal courts there was
apparently an unbroken practice of not giving national injunctions. (Yup, the
national injunction 'began / In nineteen sixty-three.')" Bray, supra. Compare to
Thomas: "These injunctions are a recent development, emerging for the first time
in the 1960s . . . ." Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2426.
Bray further wrote, "But, for various technical reasons, national injunctions
accelerate the pace of decisionmaking and reduce the number of different judicial
perspectives.... [W]hen a single court can give a national injunction, it strongly
encourages forum-shopping." Bray, supra. Compare to Thomas' concurrence:
"These injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system-
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arately to endorse a theory that Jenn Mascott originally
developed in an article, and that she later blogged about on the
Yale Journal on Regulation about how the theory related to the
question in Lucia.121
One final point needs to be made about the rise of virtual
briefing. Although, as we demonstrate above, available evi-
dence seems to indicate the Justices and the law clerks are
listening to virtual briefing, there are still almost zero citations
to blogs or podcasts in Supreme Court opinions.12 2 When cita-
tions to outside arguments do appear, it is when the initial
blogged argument is turned into an amicus brief and filed with
the Court. This observation is worth contemplating. Particu-
larly when seen in juxtaposition to the increase in citations to
amicus briefs in recent years,12 3 for some reason the Justices
seem to shy away from citing the inputs they receive from vir-
preventing legal questions from percolating through the federal courts, encourag-
ing forum shopping . . . ." Thump, 138 S. Ct. at 2425.
Bray made similar points in an article published with the Harvard Law Re-
view. Although Justice Thomas cites Bray's article in his Concurrence, Justice
Thomas did not specifically cite to Bray's article for any of these particular points.
See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunc-
tion, 131 HARv. L. REv. 417 (2017) (suggesting that the national injunction is a
recent development and arguing that federal courts should never award such
injunctions).
121 Justice Thomas wrote "[The administrative law judges of the Securities
and Exchange Commission easily qualify as 'Officers of the United States.' These
judges exercise many of the agency's statutory duties, including issuing initial
decisions in adversarial proceedings. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 200.14, 200.30-9 (2017).... All that matters is that the judges are continu-
ously responsible for performing [these statutory duties]." Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2057 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
In Mascott's blog post, she wrote, "Significant historical evidence suggests
that the original public meaning of the Appointments Clause encompassed every
federal executive official with ongoing responsibility to carry out a statutory duty.
SEC ALJs perform tasks that Congress assigned to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 200.30-9. So the
SEC's ALJs would be 'officers' under this test." Jennifer Mascott, Missing History
in the Court-Appointed Amicus Brief in Lucia v. SEC, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
CoMMENT (Mar. 28, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/missing-history-in-the-court-
appointed-amicus-brief-in-lucia-v-sec/ [https://perma.cc/Y8DT-58KV].
Mascott made similar arguments in an article published in the Stanford Law
Review, Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are "Officers of the United States"?, 70 STAN. L.
REv. 443, 564 (2018), and she also submitted an Amicus Brief to the Court
making these arguments, Brief of Professor Jennifer L. Mascott as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 17-130). Although Justice
Thomas cites Mascott's article in his opinion, he does not cite it for this particular
point, and he does not reference her amicus brief.
122 We could find only one citation to a blog in a majority opinion-a citation to
a White House blog for stories of those who won the Medal of Honor. See United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012). There were no citations to podcasts.
123 See Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Supreme Court Amicus Cu-
riae Review: Triends of the Court' Roared Back in 2017-18 Term, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
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tual briefing. There is a feeling perhaps-reflected in the cita-
tion practices-that it is improper to use the product of virtual
briefing as actual authorities in Supreme Court opinions. And
that queasiness is perhaps telling.
III
Is THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH CROWDSOURCING
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING?
All of this raises the question of whether there is anything
wrong with virtual briefing. One might reasonably question
whether there is. After all, the ultimate goal of virtual briefing
(at least in its most benign form) is to provide information and
arguments to the Court. One might assume, therefore, that
more grist for the mill cannot be bad-that the Court cannot
possibly be worse off by hearing from a wider variety of voices
before deciding momentous and consequential issues of law.
But this viewpoint seems to us oversimplistic. For over one
hundred years, Supreme Court litigation-and appellate deci-
sion-making in general-has been done according to a particu-
lar process: the advocates file briefs; amici are allowed to weigh
in with briefs of their own; and the Justices hear oral argu-
ment. Any additional filing or argumentation is strictly circum-
scribed. Virtual briefing threatens to undermine-indeed, to
circumvent-this time-tested adversarial process. It also poses
serious challenges in terms of confirmation bias, accountability
and transparency. Finally, we note the ethical quandaries it
poses for advocates.
A. Circumventing the Adversarial Process
Over a century ago, Justice Holmes explained that "[tihe
theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a
case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open
court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk
or public print."124 This theory applies not only to jurors, but
to judges as well. As to private talk, ex parte contact with
Supreme Court Justices is generally agreed to be forbidden. 125
16, 2018, (noting an increase not just in the number of amicus briefs filed but also
in the number of amicus briefs cited in Supreme Court opinions).
124 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
125 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, promulgated by the Judi-
cial Conference, provides that a judge generally "should not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications or consider other communications concerning
a pending matter that are made outside the presence of the parties or their
lawyers." CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (Judicial Conference of
the U.S. 2019). To be sure, the Code does not formally apply to Supreme Court
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And as to public print, the Justices are supposed to decide
cases based on the arguments the advocates make, not those
that nonparticipating third parties may espouse in nonjudicial
settings.
As the Court put it recently, "we rely on the parties to frame
the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present."l26 "[Olur adversary sys-
tem is designed around the premise that the parties know what
is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts
and arguments entitling them to relief."l 27 Old-fashioned or
not, there is real value to this system: much can be gained by
forcing oneself to wrestle with two sides locked into debate on
an issue-literally reading two briefs and listening to both
sides. The adversarial system is built on this foundation.
Virtual briefing does not respect his model. When an in-
terested observer issues a blogpost designed in part to influ-
ence the Court, the post floats outside of the Court's rules-
and thus outside of the adversarial system. Of course, the
same might be said of other commentary that has long ap-
peared in traditional media. But virtual briefing is different in
terms of sheer volume and the opportunity for precision. There
is only so much ground a newspaper story or op-ed can cover.
And such pieces typically need to be pitched to a generalist
audience, further limiting the effect they might have on a clerk
or Justice. The blogosphere, by contrast, allows virtually limit-
Justices. But, as Chief Justice Roberts has acknowledged, "[aill Members of the
Court do in fact consult the Code of Conduct in assessing their ethical obliga-
tions. . . . Each does so for the same compelling practical reason: Every Justice
seeks to follow high ethical standards, and the Judicial Conference's Code of
Conduct provides a current and uniform source of guidance designed with spe-
cific reference to the needs and obligations of the federal judiciary." JOHN ROBERTS,
2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDIcIARY 4-5 (2011), https://www.su
premecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/201 1year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YK3R-ZBCT. Indeed, the Chief Justice made clear that "as a practical matter,
the Code remains the starting point and a key source of guidance for the Justices
as well as their lower court colleagues." Id. at 5. The consensus among commen-
tators and other court-watchers, therefore, is that ex parte contacts with Supreme
Court Justices are inappropriate. See Jim Zirin, A Matter of Ethics, FORBES (Feb.
4, 2015, 4:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jameszirin/2015/02/04/a-
matter-of-ethics/#1d2747c62db0 [https://perma.cc/2CS9-7PFX]; Professor
Kaufman Sheds Light on Ethical Codes for Justices, HARv. L. TODAY (Feb. 24, 2005),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/professor-kaufman-sheds-light-on-ethical-
codes-for-justices/ [https://perma.cc/S7V2-UHL7] ("Presumably, Supreme
Court Justices would acknowledge that in addition to matters covered by stat-
utes, they are governed by some common law of judicial ethics.").
126 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
127 Id. at 244 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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less content. Equally important, it lends itself to targeted and
highly detailed essays. As noted above, a writer can take a
deep dive into one particular sub-issue in a case-a much
deeper dive than perhaps even the advocates, saddled with
page limits, can afford to take.1 2 8 And the posting can include
details like legal citations and endnotes that are unheard of in
traditional media-and often absent from even brick-and-mor-
tar legal publications-but are extremely useful for law clerks
and Justices. Other commentators can then elaborate further
or respond, sometimes generating a sort of online oral
argument. 129
Indeed, such back-and-forths often immediately follow the
real oral argument of a case, after the Justices have revealed
their concerns or expressed tentative views about how to decide
the case, and are mulling over how to vote at conference. Advo-
cates have no real way at that point of communicating with the
Court, yet that pivotal window of time often produces a flurry of
virtual briefing.
This extracurricular activity-all conducted in plain view
and at least sometimes for advocacy-related reasons-poses
genuine risks. For one thing, there may be reasons a lawyer for
a party does not want to make a given argument. If litigation
that reaches the Court is really a test case for an issue an
interest group cares about, the group may care more about
procuring the Court's views on a particular issue-for political
or other purposes-than generating any particular result.
Even in ordinary cases, it may not do a petitioner much good,
for example, to procure a reversal establishing a legal test that,
once discovery unfolds on remand, will be impossible to sat-
128 See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Compendium of Posts of Hobby Lobby, Zubik,
and Related Cases, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8, 2015), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2014/02/compendium-of-posts-on-hobby-lobby-and-html [https://perma.cc/
65M2-R5MF] (collecting over a dozen essays about Hobby Lobby and its various
legal dimensions); Marty Lederman, Is the Trinity Lutheran Church Case Moot?,
TAKE CARE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/is-the-trinity-lu-
theran-church-case-moot [https://perma.c/4HL3-VA9G] (exploring the jurisdic-
tional ramifications of a then-recent Facebook announcement by the Governor of
Missouri about the state program in question in the case, an illustration of the
benefits of real-time blogging in contrast to the limitations of the Court's briefing
schedules).
129 See, e.g., Rick Hills, Why Masterpiece Cakeshop Is a Harder Case Than You
Think (And Why Federalism Can Help Resolve It with a Meta-Accommodation of
Religious Disagreement), PRAwFSBlAWG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://prawfsblawg
.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/08/why-masterpiece-cakeshop-is-a-harder-case-
than-you-think-and-why-federalism-can-help-resolve-it.html Ihttps://perma.cc/
6JWB-H5QQ] (comments offered by respected commentators Marty Lederman
and Mark Tushnet).
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isfy.o30 Or it might not be in the interest of an institutional
litigant-say, the government or a Fortune 500 business-to
have a case decided on narrow, alternative grounds that leave it
still wondering what its legal obligations are going forward.
Consider, for example, the case of Frank v. Gaos.131 After
granting certiorari to address a question of class action proce-
dure and hearing oral argument, the Court directed the parties
to file supplemental briefs on the issue whether the plaintiffs
had suffered an Article III injury-in-fact sufficient to allow them
to sue Google for disclosing their search terms to third parties.
Shortly after those briefs were filed (and presumably just as the
Court was turning its attention back to the case), Orin Kerr-
an expert in the legal ramifications of digital malfeasance
whose scholarship the Court repeatedly has cited-published
an eleven-paragraph blog post, as he put it, to "add my own
thoughts on why [I] think there is standing."13 2 Kerr then
sketched out a property-rights theory of standing, asserting
that "[t]he parties have mostly missed this because they (and
some Justices at argument) seem to be thinking about this as a
privacy case."'33
But do we really think Google and the plaintiffs missed this
argument? Both were represented by former assistants to the
Solicitor General now working at law firms with active Supreme
Court practices, and both had sophisticated clients and pre-
sumably other experts at their fingertips. Did they miss it? Or
is it more likely that these seasoned and knowledgeable actors
had other reasons for framing their arguments as they did?
Of course, even when advocates consciously omit an argu-
ment from their submissions-instead of simply missing it-we
might be glad to have the argument brought to the attention of
the Justices. Indeed, in some of those instances, we might be
particularly happy to see a virtual brief point out something the
advocates preferred to keep under the rug. If the "right" legal
solution to a case is one the advocates choose not to advance,
that should not necessarily stop the Court from adopting that
solution.
130 See Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic's Place in the Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 137, 148 (2013).
131 138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018) (granting certiorari).
132 Orin S. Kerr, Article IH Standing in Frank v. Gaos, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan.
2, 2019, 5:34 AM), https: //reason.com/volokh/2019/01/02/is-there-article-iHi-
standing-in-frank-v [https://perma.cc/RHR2-7HHF]. The post also linked to
other virtual briefing on the case from Professor William Baude.
133 Id.
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But there is a flip side: when a virtual brief raises a new
argument outside of the regular process, it introduces
problems of confirmation bias and the prospect of legal error.
Temptation is already strong for the Justices to credit argu-
ments that align with their pre-existing world views. Echo
chambers and confirmation bias are dramatic in a digital
age. 134 We all look for sources to confirm what we already
believe anyway, and our information cocoons mean that we can
select news stories and factual accounts that convince us we
were right all along. 135
Virtual briefing exacerbates this dynamic. Recall that the
law clerks on Twitter followed partisan and predictable com-
mentators (clerks in chambers on the left follow bloggers on the
left and clerks in chambers on the right follow bloggers on the
right). Perhaps this is an inevitable sign of our times, but it is
important to at least acknowledge the confirmation-bias cost of
wide-open briefing avenues. Our legal system is built on the
requirement of a neutral arbiter to hear all sides of a debate in
a courtroom (and on the briefs) as the advocates confront each
other's arguments and expose weaknesses. That value is un-
dercut when the Justices and their clerks turn to other, more
familiar voices outside the arena who are providing arguments
that seem right because they confirm pre-existing views and
need not acknowledge weakness. Indeed, it must be quite
tempting to reach for the opinion of a famous and familiar voice
who says the advocates have missed something.
Granted, a closed market of ideas from advocates is not
perfect and can lead to some inequities and missed opportuni-
ties. But we are skeptical that virtual briefing results in the
triumph of the "best arguments" on a truly open market-that
is, that the Justices are taking in all possible arguments and
crediting the best ones. Instead it seems likely that with more
voices to turn to, the Justices go to the familiar and confirming,
not the unfamiliar and challenging. Under the banner of free
and more speech, in other words, virtual briefing could mean
that the Justices are only hearing the same voices on repeat.
Moreover, because virtual briefing is exempt from the ad-
versarial system, it also increases the risk of error. Consider
the case of Kennedy v. Louisiana, decided in 2008.136 The
134 For elaboration on this point, see Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications
Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296 (2010); Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an
Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 191 (2018).
135 Kahan, supra note 134, at 296.
136 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
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issue there was whether the Eighth Amendment allows the
crime of child rape to be punished by death. The question
whether a certain punishment is "cruel and unusual," in viola-
tion of that constitutional guarantee, turns in part on how
many other jurisdictions would allow it. Consequently, the
parties in Kennedy each briefed the Court on how many other
jurisdictions allowed child rape to be punished by death, ex-
plaining that only a small handful of states permitted such
punishment. Months later, the Court issued a 5-4 decision
holding that Louisiana's law violated the Eighth Amendment.
One of the reasons the Court gave was because the "Federal
Government" did not allow capital punishment for "child rape
of any kind."' 3 7
Within days of that decision, a lawyer who had not been
involved with the case asserted on a military law blog that, in
addition to state laws the Court had recognized, military law (a
species of federal law) also allowed child rape to be punished by
death. 138 In support of this assertion, the lawyer quoted a
2006 statute providing that "[ulntil the President otherwise
provides," the punishment for child rape is "death or such
other punishment as a court-martial may direct."13 9
From the text of the military statute the lawyer cited, it
certainly sounded like the Court had made an error-at least in
its multijurisdictional analysis, if not in its ultimate decision.
Breathless commentators speculated over whether the Court
would have to reverse itself.140 The Court itself was concerned
enough, after the State of Louisiana sought rehearing, to order
supplemental briefing on the issue (which was accompanied,
naturally enough, by more virtual briefing from the military
lawyer and others). 141 In that briefing, Kennedy's lawyers (who
137 Id. at 426.
138 Dwight Sullivan, The Supremes Dis the Military Justice System, CAAFLOG
(June 28, 2008), https://www.caaflog.com/2008/06/28/the-supremes-dis-the-
military-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/YH6B-9FH3].
139 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 552(b)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3263 (2006).
140 See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Dept. Admits Error in Not Briefing Court,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/us/
03scotus.html [https://perma.cc/7LS6-QSGU] (laying out the process by which
the losing party would ask for a reconsideration of the decision and the Depart-
ment of Justice might then weigh in); Orin Kerr, Question about Rehearing in
Kennedy v. Louisiana, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2008, 12:14 PM), http://
volokh.com/2008/07/31/question-about-rehearing-in-kennedy-v-louisiana/
[https://perma.cc/NKJ7-ETGH].
141 See Douglas A. Berman, Add Prof. Tribe to Those Urging Rehearing in Ken-
nedy, SEN'G L. & POL'Y (July 31, 2008), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sen-
tencinglaw-and-policy/2008/07/add-prof-tribe.html [https://perma.cc/2TB2-
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included one of the authors here) pointed out that the statute
the blog cited was simply an "interim" measure, which gave the
President the authority to set the maximum punishment for
child rape at whatever level he saw fit. 1 4 2 The President later
set the maximum at death. But, Kennedy's lawyers continued,
that executive order was seemingly insufficient to establish
that maximum penalty because the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) provides that a court-martial may impose capi-
tal punishment only when "specifically authorized by this
chapter"-that is, by the Code itself.1 4 3 The Code itself did not
do that; it provided, instead, simply that a person convicted of
child rape "shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."1 4 4
The Court ultimately denied rehearing. In a footnote
amending the opinion, the majority was careful not to take any
position on whether military law allowed capital punishment
for child rape.1 4 5 The majority stated simply that military law
did not affect its "reasoning or conclusions."1 4 6
One might think this an odd example to illustrate the risks
of virtual briefing. After all, the Court took the step of inviting
supplemental briefs from the parties (and the Solicitor General)
before relying on a legal argument advanced for the first time in
a blogpost. And that within-the-rules briefing seemingly pre-
vented the Court from relying on a potentially mistaken legal
assertion-namely, that military law allowed the death penalty
for child rape.
But we prefer to think of this as a cautionary tale-and a
warning that has not been heeded. The episode shows that
blogposts have for some time now had the capability of swaying
Supreme Court decision-making. It demonstrates that such
virtual briefing sometimes makes debatable-even sometimes
explosive-assertions that require adversarial testing. But in
the decade since the Court denied rehearing in Kennedy, it has
XKEM]; Corey Rayburn Yung, My New Article on SSRN, SEx CRIMES (Sept. 12,
2008, 10:28 PM), https://sexcrimes.typepad.com/sex-crimes/2008/09/my-
new-article.html [https://perma.cc/ZN4B-NX86] (summarizing and linking to a
brief article posted to SSRN); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Military Law Rele-
vant to the "Evolving Standards ofDecency" Embodied in the Eighth Amendment?,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 140, 140-41 (2008) (concluding that military law was
irrelevant to the Court's "evolving standards of decency" test, and therefore that
the Court should not grant Louisiana's petition for rehearing).
142 Brief for Petitioner in Opposition to Rehearing at 3 & n.1, Kennedy, 554
U.S. 407 (No. 07-343) (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 552(b)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3263 (2006)).
143 Id. at 9 & n.5 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 818) (2018).
144 10 U.S.C. § 920b(a) (2015).
145 554 U.S. 945, 945 (2008).
146 Id.
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never again ordered parties in any procedural setting to re-
spond to assertions made in virtual briefing.
As explained in Part II, the reason for this dearth of orders
cannot be that the Justices and clerks are no longer reading
blogs (or listening to podcasts). On the contrary, all indications
suggest they are following them now more than ever. The
Court seems to have decided it may do so without looping this
activity into the adversarial process. We think the Court is
proceeding at its peril.
B. Accountability and Transparency
Virtual briefing does not just threaten the procedural in-
tegrity of the adversarial process; it also presents serious ques-
tions regarding accountability and transparency. The
Supreme Court Rules require aniici to abide by demanding
directives in this regard. Specifically, the Rules (1) forbid any-
one other than amici from providing financial support for the
filing, and (2) require amici to disclose on the first page of any
filing whether anyone other than amici authored the brief in
whole or in part.1 4 7 The perceived potency of these two pre-
scriptions is reflected in the fact that, even though the second
one is phrased in terms of merely a disclosure requirement, it is
treated in practice as an outright prohibition. The accepted
wisdom is that any brief that told the Court in footnote 1 that it
was authored in part by a lawyer for a party would not even be
worth filing. 1 4 8 To our knowledge, no such brief has been filed
in years, if not decades.
Yet, virtual briefing comes with no such restrictions-at
least not in terms of the Court's rules or any other positive law.
Does this matter? An anecdote from a Supreme Court
case, Exxon Shipping v. Baker, which was litigated before the
147 Rule 37.6, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.lawcomell.edu/rules/supct/
rule_37 [https://perma.cc/EV55-B7RK].
148 The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice underscores that Rule 37.6
"reflects the Court's perception that some parties to a case had silently been
authoring or financing amicus curiae briefs in support of their positions[,]" which
would effectively help parties expand the word limits imposed on merits briefs.
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 755; see also Eugene Volokh, Should U.S. Supreme Court
Litigants Decline Consent for Filing ofAmicus Briefs?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28,
2018, 1:33 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/04/28/should-us-supreme-
court-litigants-declin [https://perma.cc/V4KH-JL4D] (noting that in Butler v.
FAA the petitioner's lawyer acted as counsel of record because he was a member
of the Supreme Court bar on an amicus prepared by a different lawyer, but that
the Court, in a rare move, denied leave to file, most likely because "the Court did
not approve of a party providing even that sort of help to the amicus").
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explosion of virtual briefing, suggests it might.149 About twenty
years ago, when Exxon Corporation was formulating its strat-
egy for challenging a jury's $5 billion punitive damages verdict
for its role in the Exxon Valdez oil spill, one thing the company
did was pay various academics to write articles questioning the
legitimacy of punitive damages. As an Exxon representative
explained to a potential author, "it's ... helpful" to a litigant "to
have people working on [favorable] articles that come out in
academic publications" or "things placed into major, policy-
related newspapers[.]"1 5 0 Supreme Court Justices may read
the pieces, and even more often, "their clerks will read
them[.]"151 Furthermore, the company's lawyers themselves
can "cite the article" or refer to it at oral argument. 152
Much has been written about this episode of funding aca-
demic work to aid in a Supreme Court appeal, partly with re-
spect to whether the academics who accepted Exxon's money
had any obligation to disclose that fact in their work.153 There
is no need to rehash all of that here. Instead, we will make
three points. First, this episode demonstrates that litigants
who have a lot to win or lose will sometimes seek to enlist
academics and others perceived as learned commentators,
with the explicit aim of influencing Supreme Court Justices.
Litigants will even go so far as to pay them to generate writings
or to publish their opinions.
Second, the Court does not believe it is appropriate to rely
on such publications. Upon learning in Exxon Shipping that
certain literature cited in the briefs was "funded in part by
Exxon," the Court went out of its way to note that it "decline[d]
to rely on it."I54 The Court did not fully spell out its reasoning
in the now-infamous footnote 17. But, as Thomas McGarity
has observed, the clear implication of the footnote is that the
Court was acting "out of a legitimate concern for the integrity of
the appellate process," trying to ensure the Justices were "not
swayed by extrajudicial attempts by the parties to influence
their thinking."15 5 That is, the Supreme Court Rules would not
149 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2007).
150 William R. Freudenburg, Seeding Science, Courting Conclusions: Reexamin-
ing the Intersection of Science, Corporate Cash, and the Law, 20 Soc. F. 3, 14, 17
(2005).
151 Id. at 16.
152 Id. at 14, 16.
153 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the Integrity of
Sponsored Law and Economics Research, 21 STAN. L. & POLY REv. 51, 51-53
(2010) (examining the integrity of privately sponsored academic research).
154 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 501 n. 17.
155 McGarity, supra note 152, at 76.
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allow the articles that Exxon funded to be submitted as amicus
briefs, so the Court thought it inappropriate to rely on them in
the same way it would rely on amicus filings.
Third, Exxon's effort was perceived as largely successful.
No one other than the Exxon representative referenced above
"expressed satisfaction" to the New York Times regarding his
efforts.1 5 6 He noted that "the arguments the justices used in
part reflected the conclusions of the studies."1 5 7 Others agree.
In the aftermath of Exxon Shipping, some commentators sug-
gested that despite the Court's disclaimer in footnote 17, the
Court's opinion tracked the reasoning of the disclaimed stud-
ies.158 The Court itself in Exxon Shipping cited repeatedly to
Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., which in turn
freely cited to one of the studies. 159
Which brings us back to the risks of virtual briefing. No
longer must a litigant or other individual seeking to influence
the Court reach out months or years in advance to would-be
authors, much less depend on the slow-churning wheels of
academic publishing. Now such persons can generate blog
posts and the like within days-they can pinpoint their issu-
ances to exactly the time at which they have the maximum
chance of being read inside the Court. And, if the author of any
such post decides to keep such sponsorship to herself, the
odds that the Court will learn of it seems fairly remote.
Of course, one might still respond to all of this with a
shrug. After all, litigants have long used friends and contacts
in the media to generate favorable stories about their cases.
156 Adam Liptak, From One Footnote, a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Sci-
ence, and Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/
11/25/washingtonl25bar.html [https://perma.cc/5U4D-4FJL].
157 Id.
158 See Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integrity and Legal
Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POLY REV.
33, 35 (2010) ("The Justices say they did not rely on the studies Exxon funded,
even though it is actually very good work AND they seem to have been affected by
it.") (quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting email from Jeffrey J. Rach-
linski, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, to Lee Epstein, Professor of Law,
Northwestern University School of Law (Aug. 1, 2008) (on fie with authors Epstein
and Clarke)); Conflicts ofInterest, Footnote 17, and Scientific McCarthyism, NATHAN
A. SCHACHTMAN (June 12, 2011, 7:14 AM), http://schachtmanlaw.com/conflicts-
of-interest-footnote-17-and-scientific-mccarthyism/ [https://perma.cc/3MUW-
4S6E] ("The footnote was curious in large part because Exxon won the case, which
leaves open why Justice Souter went out of his way to call into question research
that supported his concern about the vagaries of punitive damage awards.").
159 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 432 n.5 (2001)
(citing Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cogni-
tion and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998), one of the studies dis-
claimed in Exxon Shipping).
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Litigants not only commonly pitch news stories by supplying
proposed content in press releases, 1 6 0 but they also sometimes
coordinate the drafting of op-eds by ostensibly neutral ex-
perts.16 1 No one has seriously suggested these practices are
unseemly or particularly harmful. On the contrary, "working
the press" has come to be accepted as a critical component of at
least those Supreme Court cases dealing with high profile pub-
lic policy issues.16 2
But virtual briefing might be different. The kinds of tradi-
tional media that have been thought over the years (and to
some extent are still thought) to influence the Court tend to
have rigorous gatekeepers. Certainly not every groundless as-
sertion or conflict of interest is uncovered. But many are. The
reader of a piece in the New York Tines or the WaHl Street
160 See, e.g., News Release, ADF to Take Stand for Artistic Freedom at US
Supreme Court Tuesday, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Dec. 4, 2017), http://
www.adflegal.org/detallspages/press-release-details/adf-to-take-stand-for-artis-
tic-freedom-at-us-supreme-court-tuesday [https://perma.cc/WT37-5NNN]
(spelling out the party's basic arguments and announcing a news conference to
take place immediately following oral argument on the Supreme Court steps);
Press Release, John Kramer, Supreme Court Will Hear Case on Whether the 50
States Must Comply with U.S. Constitution's Excessive Fines Clause, INST. FOR
JUSTICE (June 18, 2018), https://ij.org/press-release/supreme-court-will-hear-
case-on-whether-the-50-states-must-comply-with-u-s-constitutions-excessive-
fines-clause/ [https://perma.cc/4DTQ-3L351 (press release immediately after the
Court granted certiorari); Press Release, Today in the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the
World Bank Group Above the Law?, EARTHRIGHTS INT'L (Oct. 31, 2018), https://
earthrights.org/media/today-in-the-u-s-supreme-court-is-the-world-bank-
group-above-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/5Z4H-2VEK] (press release immediately
after oral argument).
L61 Coordinating on the publishing of op-eds is a frequent practice. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Bagley, Hello Justices? It's Reality Calling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015),
https: / /www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/opinion/in-king-v-burwell-the-plain-
tiffs-misread-obamacare.html [https://perma.cc/MKC6-ANMT] (op-ed published
days before argument in King v. Burwell, making both legal and policy arguments
about why the Court should side with the Government's interpretation of the
Affordable Care Act); Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech
Giants More Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03 /02/opinion/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-
power.html [https://perma.cc/2KY2-F4PH] (op-ed published days after oral argu-
ment in Ohio v. American Express, a case in which Lina Khan also helped draft an
amicus brief); Stephen H. Sachs, The Supreme Court's Privacy Precedent Is Out-
dated, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
the-supreme-courts-privacy-precedent-is-outdated/2017/11/26/fe9d1ddO-cfb2
-11e7-81bc-c55a22Oc8cbe-story.html?utm term=.082dl30ae512 [https://
perma.cc/2IJ4-M6NCI (prior to argument in Carpenter, former Maryland Attor-
ney General who had argued Smith v. Maryland suggesting that Smith should be
limited).
162 See SCOTUSblog on Camera-Adam Liptak Interview Part Two, YOuTUBE
(Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OaiSb4X207k [https://
perma.cc/BJA6-V48U] (discussing the relative closeness among and between
members of the press corps and Supreme Court bar).
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Journal can take some level of comfort in knowing that at least
foundational problems with submissions will prevent their
publication, or at a bare minimum be disclosed. The same
cannot necessarily be said for the blogosphere. Even assuming
many websites apply similar journalistic practices to their own
publications, even the most conscientious, such as SCOTUS-
blog, typically link to other pieces of interest posted on other
sites. We know of no indication that such blogs somehow vet
the pieces to which they link-and yet, those stories are just a
click away for the curious law clerk or Justice.
C. Ethical Quandaries for Advocates
The discussion thus far has proceeded based on an unspo-
ken assumption-namely, that attorneys representing parties
in Supreme Court cases cannot simply post detailed essays on
SCOTUSblog and the like. If they could, then all of the concerns
explored above might not vanish, but they would surely dissi-
pate. Virtual briefing that was potentially misleading or other-
wise problematic could be met directly with responses by the
advocates. Litigants themselves would be less tempted to feed
material to others to post or even to urge others to post things
themselves. After the reply brief is filed, for example, an attor-
ney for the respondent might post a long essay entitled, "Reac-
tions to the Reply Brief and Thoughts Looking Ahead to Oral
Argument." Or the day after oral argument (and a day or two
before the Court votes in conference), an advocate could post a
3,000-word memo entitled, "My Reflections on Oral Argument,"
addressing in detail-after research and consultation-the
questions that the apparent swing Justice asked the day
before.
Would it be okay for an advocate to do this? Nothing in the
Court's rules expressly prevents it. Furthermore, it has long
been accepted that lawyers can give radio interviews preview-
ing or summarizing their arguments for radio journalists,
which are typically aired the hours before or after oral argu-
ments.163 As we noted above, one podcast run by former Su-
163 See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Justices Hear 'Bong Hits' Free-Speech Case, NPR
(Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=898
9554 [https://perma.cc/XA3B-RFZU (radio segment released the day of oral ar-
gument in Morse v. Frederick, including brief statements by Kenneth Starr and
Jay Sekulow, the advocates in the case); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Consid-
ers Cellphones and Digital Privacy, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
2017/11/29/567133874/supreme-court-considers-cellphones-and-digital-pri-
vacy [https://perma.cc/5LBH-66LJI (radio segment released the day of oral argu-
ment in Carpenter v. United States, including parts of interview with Nate Wessler,
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preme Court clerks has already taken this practice one step
further, encouraging advocates (successfully, in at least a
couple of instances) to engage in detailed discussions right
after oral argument with the goal of digging deeper into the
potentially key issues that emerged at argument.164
Yet, to our knowledge, no advocate has gone so far as to
post a virtual brief online. Why not? Probably because people
have an instinct-one we share-that it would violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's Rules. At some
point, a blog post or other virtual writing starts to resemble a
brief so closely that it becomes an end-run around the Court's
rules and fair process.
Therein lies the difficulty. Until the Court identifies the
line (if any) that advocates may not cross, lawyers will be
caught between a rock and a hard place. The Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility impose a duty of zealous advocacy.6 5
And the Rules expressly permit lawyers to make public state-
ments about a case when the "information [is] contained in a
public record"-as all legal arguments are-or when "necessary
to mitigate . . . recent adverse publicity" from a third party.16 6
So if some or all forms of virtual briefing are acceptable, then
their potential effectiveness would seem to compel lawyers to
engage in them at least sometimes. On the other hand, if some
or all forms of virtual briefing transgress the permissible
boundaries of advocacy, then lawyers had better steer clear.
Until the Court provides some form of guidance, we will con-
tinue to inhabit a world in which virtual briefing flourishes, but
that is implicitly off-limits to the people who are often best
positioned to contribute: the lawyers for the parties.
IV
POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD
What, if anything, is to be done? We are frank to say we are
not sure. Our primary goal here is to lay out the problem and
the ACLU lawyer on the case); Bryan Stevenson's Statement After Sullivan v.
Florida Argument, YouTUBE (Dec. 4, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ehOqtJ3FonA [https://perma.cc/W7ZY-HDRRI (post-argument statement and
questions from various journalists on the steps of the Supreme Court).
164 See FIRST MONDAYS, supra note 8.
165 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2018) ("A
lawyer must also act . .. with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018). For a more
robust discussion of why this rule is "unlikely" to prohibit "shadow-briefing by a
blog post[,]" see Lee, supra note 6, at 1551-53.
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to trigger a conversation. But we will offer a few thoughts
about possible paths forward.
A. No Restrictions
Perhaps the best response to the phenomenon of virtual
briefing is to do nothing at all. The First Amendment looms
large over this debate. One possibility is that the First Amend-
ment simply ties the Court's (and the law's) hands. All Su-
preme Court cases are matters of public concern. The First
Amendment, therefore, surely gives interested persons the gen-
eral right to speak and write about pending cases. This is all
the more true when persons wish to speak at "crucial
time[s],"167 such as right before a vote on whether to grant
review or right after oral argument. The Court has recently
stressed that Internet websites "can provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his
or her voice heard."16  Perhaps this right runs all the way from
journalists, through academics and other experts, through
amici to the parties' advocates themselves and guarantees
them the right to post whatever they like, in whatever form they
like, on SCOTUSblog or any other online forum.
We are hardly certain, however, that the First Amendment
offers such absolute protection. For one thing, as we have
explained, it seems overly simplistic to say that traditional me-
dia coverage of the Court cannot meaningfully be distinguished
from virtual briefing. To borrow the Court's reasoning from
Riley v. Calhfornia, saying traditional media is materially indis-
tinguishable from virtual briefing may be "like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but
little else justifies lumping them together."l6 9
Furthermore, the Court has suggested that ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6-which, under some circum-
stances, prohibits lawyers participating in a proceeding from
making public comments posing a "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" to the proceeding-likely passes First
Amendment muster.170 That being so, one commentator has
suggested that the Rules of Professional Conduct could be
167 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941).
168 Packingham v. North Carolina, 138 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). The Court
was speaking specifically about "social media" websites, but the point applies
equally to blogs and the like.
169 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
170 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1036 (1991).
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amended to prohibit lawyers representing parties or amici from
making "online statement[s] ... intended to influence the Jus-
tices" or other Court personnel involved in the decision-making
process.1 7 1 And while more speculative, it may be that a simi-
lar law or rule could be applied to the public at large.17 2 If that
is true, then it is hard to imagine a similar rule at the Supreme
Court failing First Amendment scrutiny.
But even putting First Amendment concerns aside, the
costs of regulation on the producers of virtual briefing may still
outweigh its benefits. For one thing, any regulation would pre-
sent serious administrative difficulties.1 7 3 A speaker's "intent"
is a notoriously difficult thing to pin down-even using objec-
tive markers.1 7 4 "Influence" is a similarly slippery concept.
Would an online publication simply urging careful considera-
tion of the competing arguments be covered, or would the au-
thor need to advocate a particular outcome?175 Last but not
least, would the very existence of such a rule produce a harm-
ful chilling effect? The Court is already the most cloistered and
least understood of the three branches. The notion of deterring
speech discussing its cases seems, at the very least, at cross
purposes with the goal of increasing public comprehension and
scrutiny of the Court's work.
One might even go a step further and argue that unfettered
online discussion of the Court's cases would enhance the per-
171 Lee, supra note 6, at 1562.
172 See id. at 1564-66 (reserving the question of whether lawyers participating
in a proceeding may be regulated more aggressively than the press or general
public).
173 Lee acknowledges this point. See id. at 1562 (recognizing "several line-
drawing problems" that proposed regulation would present).
174 See, e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946) ("Intent is a
subjective state, illusory and difficult to establish" through circumstantial evi-
dence). Indeed, "discerning a speaker's subjective intent is particularly difficult
based on just an electronic communication." Enrique A. Monagas & Carlos E.
Monagas, Prosecuting Threats in an Age of Social Media, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 57,
69 (2015).
175 An analogy, showing how difficult this question is, can be drawn to the
Court's campaign finance cases drawing a line between "issue advocacy" and
.express advocacy." The First Amendment fully protects the former as part of
safeguarding free speech in the marketplace of ideas. But the Court has said the
latter-which it has defined as statements expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a particular candidate-is more susceptible to regulation. See Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476-81 (2007). This line
has proved slippery and unsatisfactory, to say the least. See id. (struggling to
discern whether certain issue advocacy is the "functional equivalent" of express
advocacy); id. at 483-84 (Scalia. J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that the Court "reconsider the decision that sets us the
unsavory task of separating issue-speech from election-speech with no clear
criterion").
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ceived legitimacy of its decisions. When Congress or adminis-
trative agencies consider making new law, there are various
avenues for public participation, from town meetings to the
submission of formal written comments. Even if the lawmak-
ing bodies do not always seriously consider public comments-
indeed, even if people think corporations, interest groups, and
the like dominate the decision-making process in reality-there
is still value in providing an opportunity for people to express
their views. Yet, there are various barriers-financial and oth-
erwise-to getting one's views in front of the Justices in the
form of legal briefs. Openly embracing the notion of wide-open,
online exchanges of ideas might mitigate this problem, making
the Court seem like a less remote and elite institution. The
Court could even go a step further and host its own online
bulletin board.
B. Restrictions on Posting Virtual Briefing
Now consider the opposite path forward. Let us imagine
the Court decides to promulgate a rule forbidding the posting of
online material that serves the same function as briefs. Even if
such a prohibition could survive the constitutional scrutiny
outlined above, it would still raise a multitude of practical
problems, among them:
* To whom, exactly, would the rule apply? As noted above,
the Court quite possibly has the power to restrict the online
activities of advocates directly involved in cases-and maybe
even members of the bar more generally. But it seems highly
unlikely that the Court has the power to prohibit nonlawyers
from commenting online about pending cases. If that is cor-
rect, then the effectiveness of any restriction on virtual brief-
ing would limited at best. Remember that many law
professors are not members of the bar, nor are other poten-
tially informed commentators. That is to say nothing of the
irony inherent in forbidding those most likely to have exper-
tise on a subject from speaking, while allowing all others to
offer their views.
* How, exactly, would the Court distinguish between virtual
briefing and ordinary, traditional commentary? The premise
of this paper is that there is a qualitative difference between
virtual briefing and ordinary, traditional commentary on
pending cases. But we also acknowledge that this distinction
involves line-drawing. How is the Court (or whoever else
would administer a prohibition on virtual briefing) to enforce
that rule? Certainly, the First Amendment would not tolerate
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a system of preclearance and prior restraints.17 6 Any en-
forcement system would have to operate on a post hoc basis.
Once that concession is made, we already have the problem
that "illicit" material will still sometimes be published and
made available to Justices and their clerks.
* How would restrictions be monitored and enforced? Once
potentially objectionable pieces are posted, one wonders how
complaints would be registered. Litigants might be loath to
file motions or otherwise bring particular virtual briefs to the
Court's attention, simply for fear of highlighting them (even if
they are ultimately taken down). Others may lack any real
incentive to call out questionable posts. Furthermore, what
kind of sanction for violating the rule would be appropriate?
Simply taking down the post? A fine? Revocation of member-
ship in the Supreme Court bar? Each potential remedy
raises its own thorny constitutional and ethical issues.
C. Internal Restrictions on the Court Itself
Given the obstacles to restricting the producers of virtual
briefing, perhaps the smarter solution is to regulate the con-
sumption of virtual briefing. In other words, perhaps the Court
could institute an internal restriction barring law clerks (and
themselves?) from reading posts on the internet about a case
while it is pending. As noted above, the Court already bars law
clerks from engaging in certain social media activities.1 7 7 And
the general notion of a court's restricting its own participants
in the adversarial process from reading outside material of any
kind is hardly a novel concept.
Consider, for example, how we treat jurors. The ABA's
Standards for balancing fair trial rights against the rights of the
press advise that, in all cases "likely to be of significant public
interest," jurors should be admonished as follows:
During the time you serve on this jury, there may appear in
the newspapers or on radio or television reports concerning
this case, and you may be tempted to read, listen to, or watch
them. Please do not do so. Due process of law requires that
the evidence to be considered by you in reaching your verdict
meet certain Standards for example, a witness may testify
about events personally seen or heard but not about matters
told to the witness by others. Also, witnesses must be sworn
to tell the truth and must be subject to cross-examination.
176 See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) ("[The main
purpose of [the First Amendment] is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications.'") (alterations in original) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. At-
torney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
177 See Strickler, supra note 59, at 70.
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News reports about the case are not subject to these Stan-
dards, and if you read, listen to, or watch these reports, you
may be exposed to information which unduly favors one side
and to which the other side is unable to respond. In fairness
to both sides, therefore, it is essential that you comply with
this instruction.178
It is not hard to imagine adapting this instruction to deal
with virtual briefing; indeed, much of the reasoning maps di-
rectly onto the challenges that virtual briefing raises.1 7 9
A prohibition along these lines with respect to virtual brief-
ing would have the virtue of regulating only internal actors,
leaving the blogosphere free to host the exchange of whatever
ideas about pending cases advocates and other interested par-
ties might like to publish. There is thus no First Amendment
problem at all. An age-old remedy for objectionable speech,
after all, is simply to avert our eyes. 180
The first question that arises here, of course, is whether
the Court would really be willing to lay down such a rule. The
Justices have never been willing to formalize any rules of ethics
for themselves, instead leading each chambers to police it-
self. 1 11 An internal rule forbidding all Justices and clerks from
consuming material on the internet as they see fit would be a
sharp break from tradition.
Even if the Court were willing to impose restrictions on
itself, there would also be another difficulty in terms of enforce-
ment. Advocates are already deeply in the habit of citing
sources on the internet in their briefs. Assuming virtual brief-
ing would continue at least to some degree on its own terms
(and assuming the Court's internal rule meant advocates
should not cite virtual briefs), then advocates would be right
back in the position of having to decide what postings are so
178 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS 8-3.6(d) (AM. BAR
Ass'N 1988), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
abanews/1273614736_20 1 1_7 upload file.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P5SL-Y6F6; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§23.3(g), at 1128-29 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing this proposed admonition and
noting that the judge generally may sequester the jury if this mere instruction
might be ineffective).
179 We acknowledge of course that similar virtual-briefing temptations face
jurors and trial judges. Like it or not, the googling juror and googling trial judge
are likely part of our current reality. See generally Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guth-
rie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial Notice in the Information Age, 108 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1137 (2014) (discussing the access of information on the internet by judges,
jurors, and litigants).
180 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
181 See ROBERTS, supra note 125, at 4-5.
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much like a brief that they implicate the Court's rule-and the
Court would be right back in the position of having to enforce
its rule against lawyers.
A related restriction the Court could impose internally
would be not to avert their eyes completely, but at least to insist
on some quality control. As explained above, there is a spec-
trum of virtual briefing-some more sophisticated than others.
If the Justices and their clerks are going to consume legal
blogposts and podcasts, they could ostensibly limit themselves
to those that pass some sort of internally agreed-upon, quasi-
objective standards of excellence (e.g., only deep dive posts,
only arguments that have been explored fully in scholarship
elsewhere, only claims that wrestle with counterarguments).
Consider an analogy to Wikipedia. Wikipedia is the ulti-
mate product of information crowdsourcing-anyone can up-
date it at any time. For that reason, it is in many circles still
considered out of bounds to cite Wikipedia as an authority,
despite the fact that almost everybody uses the site to answer
their questions and recent studies indicate it is no less reliable
than Encyclopedia Britannica (a claim Britannica disputes). As
one scientist explains, "Academics use Wikipedia all the time
because we're human. It's something everyone is doing."1 82
The go-to move-even for scientists-seems to be to use
Wikipedia, but not to rely on Wikipedia. Supreme Court con-
sumers of virtual briefing could adopt the same strategy, per-
haps using the mechanisms of the adversarial system to
quality check arguments that are found outside of it.
D. Transparency
Finally, this leads us to what is perhaps the most sensible
and realistic way forward-to promote transparency. The
Court could, in other words, reach out to the virtual briefing
world and bring it into the fold of traditional briefing. For ex-
ample, when a Justice sees a new argument online, he or she
could ask for supplemental briefing on the issue or appoint an
amicus if it is not an argument the parties are willing to adopt.
This strategy would bring several advantages. For one, it
would leave control over virtual briefing with the Justices
who-after all-are in the best position to know when they are
being influenced by the crowdsourcing dynamic of virtual brief-
182 See Bethany Brookshire, Wikipedia Has Become a Science Reference
Source Even Though Scientists Don't Cite It, ScicuRious (Feb. 5, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/scicurious/wikipedia-science-reference-ci-
tations [https://perna.cc/X652-TB2V].
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ing and when they are not. Similarly, promoting transparency
falls right in line with other case management strategies the
Justices are familiar with, such as appointing amici to argue in
front of them when the parties have taken positions that are
not adverse.183 It is likewise consistent with tools (like special
masters or court-appointed experts) that federal courts gener-
ally have before them when they find themselves grappling for
more information or arguments on an aspect of the case that
have not been adequately briefed.18 4
Further, requiring disclosure captures one of the principal
benefits of virtual briefing-i.e. its public nature. If the Jus-
tices are troubled by an issue or an argument to the extent that
they feel they need more information from outside the briefs,
disclosing this fact while the case is pending will generate more
voices to weigh in at critical moments-and importantly will
give the parties a chance to weigh in with their own views on
the supposedly overlooked issue or argument. It will also mean
that these views will be sharpened to address precisely the
issues for which they can make the greatest impact.
In this way, borrowing an analogy that one of us has used
in the past, the Court would operate like an administrative
agency in notice and comment rule-making-notifying interest
parties about potential rule changes and then digesting the
"comments" before making a final decision.18 5 It is worth not-
ing that in the agency context, disclosure is a very important
normative value promoted by courts enforcing the APA: an
agency must, for example, disclose all data and studies that
animate its thinking before the final rule is released, and it
183 See Kate Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court's Ani-
cus Invitations, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1585-92 (2016).
184 See JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-APPOINTED
EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
706 at 44 (1993); Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use of Special
Masters in Federal Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2009) (explaining that
after a 2003 amendment, "courts expanded special masters' roles to include su-
pervising pre-trial discovery disputes, conducting settlement negotiations in com-
plex cases, implementing and enforcing post-judgement orders and decrees, and
administering and distributing limited settlement funds").
185 Larsen, supra note 13, at 1804. Of course, it is important to remember
objections that the Court should not be acting like an administrative agency.
(Some understandably may find the analogy to be unflattering.) Our point is
merely that once one accepts the premise the Court will look outside of the
adversarial process for information (like an administrative agency does in notice
and comment) perhaps the Court should also adopt safeguards that surround
agency decision-making in this context.
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cannot make a final rule that is not "adequately flagged" by the
notice. 186
The point of these safeguards, of course, is to make sure
that the notice and comment procedure is an informed one-
that all voices know where the conversation is headed and
what matters the most to the decision-makers.187 The same
normative justification accompanies our virtual briefing dis-
cussion. If "crowdsourcing" is where the Justices want to go,
then perhaps we should take efforts to ensure that all members
of the crowd (including, importantly, the advocates themselves)
are on notice as to what is influencing the decision-maker
before the decision comes down; only in this way will the con-
versation be targeted and sophisticated. Put differently, disclo-
sure will encourage "deep dive" virtual briefing and discount
"hot takes."
Finally, requiring disclosure in this way would alleviate the
costs outlined above that come with short-circuiting the adver-
sarial process. If the parties are on notice that the Justices
need more information, they can weigh in themselves-mar-
shalling their own experts, making their own strategic choices,
and addressing arguments from the crowd they think are
wrong. This can help prevent mistakes, promote transparency
and accountability, and solve the ethical quandary that cur-
rently afflicts Supreme Court advocates in a virtual briefing
world.
CONCLUSION
In the end, there may be no perfect tonic for the modem
phenomenon of virtual briefing and the problems it poses. But
the phenomenon seems here to stay; indeed, it is becoming
more prevalent and aggressive each year. We are convinced
that the current response-allowing virtual briefing to occur
unrecognized and without evaluation-is unwise. Crowd-
sourcing Supreme Court decisions may be the wave of the fu-
ture, but it is not a future we should enter without discussion
and critical thought.
186 See, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241,
1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the agency relied on one particular environ-
mental study and explaining that "[tihe APA generally obliges an agency to publish
for comment the technical studies and data on which it relies").
187 Larsen, supra note 13, at 1813 ("After the notice, interested parties are
given a chance to comment on the agency's proposal. If the notice falls to provide
an accurate picture of the reasoning motivating the agency's thinking-including
the factual basis for its proposal-the comment period will become meaningless.")
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